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This study investigates the effect of economic sanctions on Iran’s macroeconomy. To achieve 
particular objectives, the US and UN often choose sanctions over war and most politicians 
believe that these two options have the same level of effectiveness. Moreover, sanctions are 
used more and more to put pressure on the target country and force the country to meet the 
particular objectives.  However, the literature and history has demonstrated that the 
effectiveness of sanctions tends not to be high.  This study determines the effectiveness of the 
sanctions imposed on Iran and investigates the effects of sanctions on important 
macroeconomic variables during a specific time period. The variables included are the main 
variables in the macroeconomy, in particular, oil exports are included due to the fact that its is 
an important aspect of Iran’s economy as it is a large oil exporting country and also the main 
target for the sanctions. Because of the importance of the oil sector, the sanctions imposed on 
Iran have focused more and more on Iran’s oil exports. Sanctions on Iran were started by the 
US unilaterally and later accompanied by the UN and the EU and became multilateral. In this 
study `I have presented a brief history of the Iranian economy and how the Central Bank of 
Iran operates.  In the three empirically based chapters, different approaches are used to analyses 
the effect of sanctions on the economy. First the vector autoregressive approach is used with 
impulse response functions and variance decompositions and the findings shows that shocks to 
oil exports have more effect on the exchange rate than the other variables and the budget deficit 
and imports are less likely to be affected. Next a two regime Markov switching model is used 
to determine the reaction of the variables in two states of sanctions and where there are no 
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sanctions. Thirdly I have investigated the exchange rate misalignment in Iran and determined 
the existence of the deviation. In general, the findings show that the main macroeconomic 
variables that have been affected the most are the exchange rate and also inflation. But GDP 







Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy and whether 
the sanctions have had a significantly negative effect on the key macroeconomic variables. Iran 
was chosen as it is a good example of a country reacting to specific sanctions and due to its 
unique historical and geographical situation and the unique international sanctions imposed on 
the country. Different countries around the world use sanctions as an economic and political 
tool in order to change the behaviour of a targeted country. Previous research has analysed 
whether sanctions are effective or ineffective and moreover the impact of the sanctions. 
Sanctions on Iran are most important to the banking and energy sector, especially the oil sector 
(Shaeri et al. 2016) and Iran has been one the largest oil producers and oil exporters and has 
historically provided crude oil for many countries around the world, so is a good example of 
the implications of sanctions on oil exporters. In addition, oil is an essential aspect of the 
international political economy, in terms of wealth and the wider effects on the environment, 
as recently efforts have been made to reduce its consumption to prevent climate change. 
However, politically the sanctions have been the concern of many other countries over recent 
years. The US and other countries started imposing sanctions on Iran after the revolution in the 
late 1970s and more recently to stop its nuclear program. Sanctions have been used around the 
world as a force to gain specific political objectives and are also a tool for foreign policy 
(Yavari et al. 2009). Economic sanctions are considered as an alternative to war and are also 
less costly. Askari et al. (2003) defined sanctions as “coercive measures imposed by one 
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country or coalition of countries against another country, its government or individual entities 
therein, to bring a change in behaviour of politics.”  
Sanctions can be imposed unilaterally from one country or multilaterally from more than one 
country, as Iran has experienced. The first sanctions were imposed by Athens in 432 B.C. The 
United Nation first applied sanctions in 1963 on South Africa and by the mid 1980s the 
economic growth of this country fell by a half and they reached an agreement with the UN. 
However, the US imposed economic sanctions against Cuba in 1960 and against Rhodesia in 
1966.  
Economic sanctions have been argued to have effects on economic and political behaviour 
(Hufbauer et al. 2009). The effect of sanctions on the sender are limited and depend on the 
situation of the targeted country and how the sanctions are imposed. As I am mainly interested 
in the effectiveness of the sanctions on Iran, I focus on how the sanctions affected the economy 
and welfare in Iran. Hufbauer (2009) suggested that economic sanctions are successful 33% of 
the time and the effectiveness of sanctions reduces in the long run in terms of changing the 
political behaviour of the targeted government. This reduction in successfulness of sanctions 
in the long run can be due to the fact that the targeted country usually tries to offset the effects 
on its economy. For example, in the case of Iran, the imposing of sanctions on the oil sector 
reduced the government’s oil revenue and the government tried to offset this reduction by 
reforming subsidies and increasing tax. However, leaders continue imposing sanctions.  
 Some studies have suggested that sanctions can even make the target country stronger, whereas 
the target country must be made more vulnerable by the sanctions if it is to be forced to agree 
with the sender (Allen 2005 and Souva 2007). Overall sanctions that have more costs on the 
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target country are more likely to be successful (Drury 1998). However, if the sender and the 
target countries are trading partners then the sanctions are more likely to be effective and if 
they are not important trading partners then the target country can offset sanctions by switching 
to other countries. To prevent this happening, international collaboration is essential (Martin 
1992). This also usually means that unilateral sanctions are not as successful as multilateral 
sanctions. Iran has used this strategy of switching trading partners to offset the imposed 
sanctions, however it is not clear how effective this policy has been. One if the issues of 
multilateral sanctions are that there may be disagreements between the senders which again 
has happened with the sanctions imposed on Iran. We can see that for example for some years 
EU countries were opposed to the US sanctions imposed on Iran and did not cooperate with 
the US, which was beneficial for Iran. Once sanctions are in place the targeted country applies 
strategies to offset the effects of the sanctions (Early 2009).  These strategies may be beneficial 
for the third parties who are the new partners of the targeted country. Allen (2005) noted that 
sanctions that focus on regime change are less likely to be successful. Bahrami (2012) found 
that sanctions’ effects on changing the behaviour of a government tend to be poor and mostly 
it’s the population that suffers from the pressure of the sanctions.  
1.1- Motivation and contribution:  
Oil is the main source of energy across the world (more than 75%) since the mid 1950s and 
changes in oil prices can affect both oil exporters and oil importers and some countries are 
heavily dependent on oil and oil products. The oil supply has tightened in the past years mostly 
due to political decisions around the world such as sanctions on Iran which were imposed by 
the US and the reduction in oil production in Venezuela. These events have reduced the oil 
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supply and caused an upward trend in oil prices around the world. According to Hamilton 
(2003), fluctuations in oil prices which are mainly are due to oil supply changes, have a 
negative effect on the economy. However, Blanchard and Gali (2007) suggested that oil prices 
and economic growth relationships are less important and determined that there is a more 
significant effect of oil price fluctuations on inflation in the 1970s rather than the 2000s (IMF 
report, 2017). Oil has a significant role in the economic cycle and its fluctuations have a 
significant effect on the global economy such as causing spikes in inflation and interest rates 
which happened in the US in 2008.  
 The first studies analysing the effectiveness of sanctions were in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Hufbauer 1990). This study contributes to the literature by including a variety of 
macroeconomic factors into the modelling of sanctions such as the exchange rate, oil exports, 
imports, budget deficits and inflation. In addition, we analyse the effects using a variety of 
approaches not used previously which account for the non-linear nature of this relationship. 
However, as the number of instances of using sanctions has increased around the world, the 
literatures’ focus has shifted from the effectiveness of sanctions to policymakers’ decisions 
about using sanctions. A few studies argue that sanctions are used by leaders to gain domestic 
political support (Whang 2011).  Although many studies determine that the sanctions’ 
effectiveness is marginal but there is some efficacy in some cases. 
The US encouraged international sanctions on Iran to achieve its political objectives, with the 
sanctions imposed on Iran changing constantly.  I have chosen Iran because firstly sanctions 
imposed on Iran were worldwide from many countries such as the US, EU countries and also 
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the United Nations. Secondly there are not that many studies on the Iranian economy despite 
the fact that it is the centre of attention of the international community  
 Most studies are usually about the developed countries rather than developing countries and 
also the literature on the Iranian economy and the imposed sanctions are rare. Moreover, studies 
rarely analyse how the target country may respond to the imposed sanctions. Unlike most of 
the literature this study is not following the optimist or pessimist perspective of sanctions and 
it focuses on the empirical effects and responses regarding imposed sanctions. This study 
focuses on the economic effects of sanctions on Iran’s economy. The data used is over an 
extended time period relative to other studies, limited by its availability and covers the 
maximum time period. The interest rate which is used in many studies in not included here due 
to the Islamic nature of the Iranian economy and the tight control of government. Also, rather 
than focusing on inflation, which has become less of a problem internationally at the moment, 
I have used oil exports, inflation, exchange rates, GDP, imports and the budget deficit. This 
study develops a model for the Iranian economy following Esfahani et al (2009) and focuses 
on oil exports and sanctions to allow me to investigate the effects of these factors on the 
macroeconomy of Iran.  
The US and UN mostly use economic sanctions rather than war to achieve their political 
objectives such as ending the Libyan oppression against its civilians or ending North Korea’s 
nuclear program. In the case of Iran, they have imposed sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear 
program. Some believe that sanctions have the same effect as war which has not always been 
true for example in the case of North Korean sanctions which were not effective. My study 
analyses the effects of sanctions on Iranian macroeconomy, in particularly on the economic 
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factors which are most important to the economy such as oil exports. This study investigates 
the effects of sanctions over time on Iran’s macroeconomy. 
We can see that sanctions did not force the Iranian government to change its goals as expected 
and there were always some strategies to bypass the sanctions, however, not offsetting the 
sanctions completely but they have helped the government to resist changes in its behaviour or 
economic policies, as other aspects of the economy have adjusted to ensure the effectiveness 
is limited. 
1.2-  Summary of chapters: 
 Following the introduction, the second chapter gives a general view on the background to the 
Iranian economy and how the most important economic variables such as GDP, CPI and oil 
exports have changed over the years before and after sanctions were imposed. Moreover, there 
is a description of the sanctions that Iran has faced since the first sanctions in the early 1980s. 
We can see the response of oil production to sanctions which is a reduction from 4 million 
barrels per day to 3 million barrels per day from 2005 to 2013. Iran’s central bank reported a 
reduction of 5.8% in GDP in 2013 and there are significant fluctuations in GDP and inflation. 
In addition, the monetary and fiscal policy is described in this chapter and presents the Islamic 
banking approach of the Central Bank of Iran.  The third chapter is an empirical study on the 
effects of sanctions on the economy through the vector autoregression approach and impulse 
response functions. The Theory of sanctions’ importance to oil in the economy is also 
presented. We can see a fluctuating response of GDP and insignificant response of CPI to oil 
exports. Moreover, we can see that the exchange rate is more affected than the other 
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macroeconomic variables, helping to buffer the wider economy from the adverse effects of the 
sanctions. 
The fourth chapter evaluates the Markov regime switching model to investigate the switches 
between regimes in the presence of sanctions and without sanctions. As we can see oil 
embargoes have not affected the oil prices and GDP has been slightly negatively affected by 
the imposed sanctions. However, the exchange rate and inflation are affected. The fifth chapter 
investigates the exchange rate and presents the exchange rate system in Iran. Both official and 
black-market exchange rates have been studied in this chapter and exchange rate misalignment 
has been discussed and the inefficiency of monetary policy has been shown to occur. We can 





Chapter 2: Background to the Iranian Economy: 
 
2.1- Introduction: 
Iran is the second largest economy within the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries and has the fourth largest crude oil reserves in the world according to The World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Iranian economy is highly dependent on oil 
revenues and as a result the economy is vulnerable to changes in the oil sector. The most 
important events that have affected the economy are the Iran-Iraq war, oil price fluctuations 
and most importantly over a long period of time from the 1980s until now, sanctions and 
diplomatic isolation. International trade is an important determining factor in economic growth 
and welfare. Iran’s international trade is significantly dependent on its resources and the 
consequences of internal and external political conflicts along with the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iran, mostly by the US.  
The production and consumption of energy has changed in Iran in comparison to its previous 
pre-sanctions’ situation and these periods of time can be divided to two further periods of time; 
before 1980 when the first multilateral US sanction was imposed, and after 1980 when US 
unilateral sanctions continued, extended and tightened and moreover, EU and UN multilateral 
sanctions were added to US multilateral sanctions. Because of the sanctions and limited foreign 
investment, production has decreased but consumption has increased because of population 
growth. The Iranian currency is no longer exchangeable, and as a result corruption has 
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increased. Imports have become more expensive and a black market has developed in which 
the actual exchange rate may be more than its official rate (Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013). 
2.2- Oil and the Iranian economy: 
According to Mohaddes (2019) 60% of Iran’s foreign exchange revenue and 40% of 
government revenue are from oil exports. Oil started to be produced in 1908 but the level of 
oil export profits was initially limited and not significant. Oil export revenue became important 
to the Iranian economy during the 1960s, when there were oil contracts between Iran and 
international companies, mainly in the UK. According to the World Bank and Central bank of 
Iran reports Since 1960 the oil revenues have expanded significantly and become an essential 
source of revenue. In the 1970s the oil price increased, raising substantial oil income for the 
Iranian economy. In 1979 oil exports halved due to the revolution and since then they have 
been volatile, mainly due to economic sanctions targeting the oil and gas industry. Iran’s oil 
revenue has been more volatile than oil prices mainly due to economic sanctions which has had 
a negative effect on production. To deal with the effect of oil price volatility, Iran attempted to 
set up an oil stabilization fund but this was closed relatively quickly. Oil income volatility then 
increased from 35 percent per annum between 1960 and 1978 to 51 percent per annum from 
1979 to 2010 compared to the oil price volatility which during the same time increased from 
11percent per annum to 26 percent per annum (Mohaddes et al 2012). 
Oil production in Figure 2.1 has increased significantly since 1960. Oil production peaked in 
1974 and has slightly decreased thereafter. Iran exported 5 million barrels of oil per day in 
1987, which has since decreased to 2 million barrels per day in 2012. China and India have 
become the main consumers of Iranian oil and they have increased their demand over recent 
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years. More recently the US energy information administration has reported a decrease of 
875000 barrels per day in Iran’s oil production between 2011 and 2014 (Central Bank of Iran). 
Figure2.1: Oil production 
 
 















Figure2.2: Oil revenue, percent of GDP: 
 
Source: personal collection, Data from central bank of Iran, IMF and world bank 
The income from oil exports relative to GDP presented in figure 2.2 increased to 47 percent in 
1974 and the revenue from oil has gradually became more and more important to the Iranian 
economy. An increase in oil production up until 1975 following the rise in oil prices lead to 
increases in oil revenues. The oil exports to GDP ratio decreased by around 12 percent from 
1979 to 1988, but started to increase slightly afterwards. Oil export revenues have had a rapid 
increase since 2003 and reached a peak in 2008. But by 2010 it had fallen by about 40 percent 












2.3- Before the revolution: 
Iran’s economy was transformed from being agricultural based to an industrial economy 
between 1946 and 1979 and experienced sustained growth. The World Bank reported Iran’s 
annual economic growth rate of 9.6 percent per annum during 1960 and 1977 which was double 
the average growth rate in other developing countries and also was higher than the average 
growth rate of the developed countries1. There was an expansion in the economy and inflation 
was at its lowest rate until the 1974 oil boom. The Iranian currency was also then at its 
strongest.   
2.4- After the revolution: 
According to reports from Central bank of Iran, since 1979 following the revolution, the 
economy declined significantly and there were significant falls in GDP and a significant rise 
in inflation. The economic recovery after the end of the Iran Iraq war lasted for only a short 
period of time. The recovery was short-lived. After the revolution in 1979 Iran faced a deep 
recession and between 1981 and 1986 there was a period of recovery from this recession. 
Although there was a mild recession from 1987 to 1989, after 1989 and by the end of the Iran-
Iraq war, there was a further recovery. Since the 1980s Iran has faced unilateral sanctions from 
the US and also the UN, whilst the EU sanctions were imposed on Iran some years later.  
Oil prices and economic sanctions are the main factors affecting the Iranian economy, but as 
in other developing countries, weak economic policies and corruption are also influencing the 
economy domestically (Pesaran and Mohaddes, 2012). The Multiple exchange rate regime in 
                                               
1 World Development Report, World Bank, August 1979. Pp. 128-9 
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Iran has had many problems and due to this fact, for the improvement of Iran’s economic 
efficiency, the World Bank and IMF indicated a unification of the exchange rates. Under the 
Rafsanjani leadership Iran adopted some economic reforms in the 1990s including the IMF’s 
recommendations such as privatization and exchange rate unification which were not 
successful. In 1993 the exchange rate reform was determined by officially pegging the 
currency. The first reform of economic liberalization was unsuccessful due to barriers and 
corruption during the process of privatisation.  During Khatami’s leadership from 1997 to 2005, 
there also followed a privatization programme, although during Ahmadinejad’s leadership this 
policy was opposed and previous reforms were abolished, which was a factor in the increasing 
rate of inflation (Central Bank of Iran).  
The period after the revolution and the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war were dominated by 
significant government control over markets and firms and the state mobilization of resources. 
From 1989 there have been a series of economic reforms, mostly market oriented reforms and 
following that, the liberalization of the foreign exchange market in 1993, which was not 
successful and caused a debt and balance of payment crisis (Pesaran, 2000). Between 1900 and 
2000 there was a transformation of the Iranian economy in terms of productivity, structure and 
international trade doubled relative to GDP.  Moreover, the capital markets expanded 
significantly. Since the 1979 revolution, banks started an interest free Islamic framework in 
which predetermined payments like interest rates are not allowed and it works on a profit and 
loss sharing basis. However, banks operate like conventional banks and have fixed interest 
rates regarding loans and deposits which are not associated with the return on deposit sharing 
(Mazarei 2019). The Central Bank of Iran established maximum deposit rates and credit 
allocation guidelines and has changed the maximum interest rates many times due to economic 
22 
 
pressures such as sanctions. In 2012 after the sanctions were imposed on Iran, the unofficial 
black-market rates were increased significantly and have remained unchanged since 2018 when 
the US reinstated all its sanctions. The Islamic financial framework has limited the monetary 
tools available to the Central Bank of Iran. 
2.5- Economic Statistics: 
The United Nations and USA are the most common imposers of sanctions. However, for a 
sanction to succeed, it needs to include the financial sector, especially international banking. A 
sanction is considered to work if it accomplishes the goals and objectives specified at the outset. 
An empirical study by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg (2010) revealed that sanctions 
succeeded 23% of the times they are applied but depends on the sanctions’ objectives. They 
define successful sanctions as the partial or full achievement of the aims of imposing sanctions 
and it should be significantly due to the imposed sanctions. They further argued that sanctions 
often deter future misbehaviour. Also, they believe that applying trade and financial sanctions 
together are more effective than applying only trade sanctions. They define that sanctions are 
more likely to be effective when the target country is democratic or friendly and there are 
limited goals. The number of economic sanctions has increased overtime, as is evident in the 
figure below, which is a brief summary of the trend in economic sanctions. 
Arad and Hilliman (1979) believe that trade bans reduce the future costs experienced under 
sanctions of goods and services by forcing the target country to improve those specific 
productions and become less reliant on traded goods. Salehi (2015) presented evidence of a 
nonlinear regime switching behaviour in Iran and found that Iran’s economy has had moderate 
growth after experiencing the 1992 and 1995 recessions. 
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Figure 2.3: Trends in Economic Sanctions 
 
Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics 
The number of economic sanctions has increased tremendously since 1914 in the world. The 
USA has pursued most of the sanctions as can be seen by the increasing number of unilateral 
and non-unilateral US cases. The table below summarizes the principal senders and targets of 
the economic sanctions by regions. The table indicates that the USA has applied economic 




Table2.1: Principal Senders and Targets 
Principal Senders  Principal Targets 
 1970-89 1990-99   1970-89 1990-99 
USA 25 38  Africa 5 18 
EC/EU 5 19  Asia 7 8 
USSR/Russia 0 6  Latin America 10 8 
UN 1 11  Middle East 4 3 
    USSR/RSU 3 8 
Source: Peterson Institute for International Economics 
According to data from the IMF, CBI AND world Bank the performance of Iran’s GDP growth 
over the previous 55 years is demonstrated in figure 2.3 and is taken from the Central Bank of 
Iran’s statistics.  A year before the revolution in 1979 the economy began to have a downward 
trend and continued its downward trend after the revolution. During the revolution the 
government took over and nationalised all large firms and banks and financial companies and 
applied many restrictions on their business. The subsequent Iran/Iraq war also adversely 
affected the economy significantly. 
After the initial high growth rates, Iran’s GDP growth decreased to on average 1.5 percent 
annually between 1978 and 1989, although between 1989 and 1991 the average annual growth 
rate increased by7.2 percent.  In 1976 crude oil production reached 5.6 million barrels per day 
and it fell to 1.4 million barrels per day from 1980 to1982, but increased to 3.3 million barrels 
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per day after the Iran-Iraq war, but this was still below the production in 1970s. The share of 
oil in GDP dropped from 35% in the 1970s to 14% in the 1980s. There was also high inflation, 
with the CPI increasing from 1979 to 1991 by 637%. 
In the 1990s the economic growth increased by 2.4% per annum from 1992 to the 1999 period. 
In 1998-1999, The decline in oil revenue prevented any growth from 1996 to 1997. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s the annual growth rate increased to 6.5% in 1996 and the average 
economic growth was approximately 5% between 2000 and 2007 with a minimum of 4.5%, in 
2007 the economic growth reached 6.9%. and in 2013 it reached 7.6%. The annual inflation 
rate was 11% in 2006 and increased to 18% in 2007. The main factor contributing to high 




Figure 2.4: The performance of real GDP 
 
source: World bank and IMF 
 
According to the data from IMF database, in Iran there has been a significant link between its 
oil revenues and economic growth. Between 1980 and 1982 there was a significant decrease in 
oil revenues and also a drop in GDP. Oil revenues then increased from 1982 to 1984 and there 
was another decline from 1984 to 1986 and also declines in the GDP. between 1989 to 1991 
there was an increase in oil revenues which helped the economy to develop. Although there 
was a decline in 1993 that caused the GDP significantly to decrease. In 2000 and 2002 oil 
prices increased from their previous lows and Iran experienced high growth. Moreover, oil 
revenues have had an effect on the exchange rate. oil revenue decreased in the middle of the 
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1990s caused by an increase in the dollar’s purchasing power and this trend reversed in the late 
1990s.  
Before the mid 1990s, foreign trade and the foreign exchange market were controlled by the 
government and that caused a different relationship between oil revenue and the exchange rate. 
The government reduced the import demand to appreciate the currency. After a decline in oil 
revenues the government tightened the controls to encourage a more positive relationship 
between the exchange rate and foreign income.  
The intervention in the foreign exchange markets caused an inefficient allocation of resources 
in terms of exports and the lower value of the currency resulted in buying in fewer domestic 
goods with oil revenue and delayed capital formation. Other aims arising from the 
governments’ significant market controls in response to shocks was keeping inflation low 
which was effective in the short run, but caused more inflation in the long run mainly in an 
attempt to close the gap between the official and market exchange rate and mild overvaluation 
of the exchange rate through the multiple exchange rate system. 
According to Zahedi and Azadi (2018), Money supply mis management by the central bank 
caused more inflation, there was a sharp rise in inflation in the 1980s which coincided with the 
political instability, oil revenue falls and external conflicts. Although monetary expansion 
helped the real money balances, there was lower inflation from 1984-5 due to oil revenue rises 
and in 1986 there was a significant increase in inflation due to oil price declines and the Iran-
Iraq war which continued till 1989 and resulted in the collapse in real money balances. Then 
there was a fall in inflation and rise in real money balances afterwards which can be seen in fig 
1 d and e. In 1990 deregulation of the money markets along with the currency depreciation 
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caused higher prices, also there was an expansion in fiscal spending which helped inflation to 
rise in the early 1990s.  
In 1991-1992 Due to significant increases in imports and stagnation in oil revenues there was 
a deficit in the balance of payments which increased significantly in 1993-1994. Foreign debt 
started to increase and also increased the balance of payment crisis when oil revenue decreased 
in 1993. By 1993 foreign debt was around 30 billion dollars. Oil revenue reduction and OPEC 
production quotas in the following years resulted in the rescheduling of the debt to 1996. 
Increased output growth and imports moderately decreased inflation up until the 1993-1994 
balance of payment crisis which caused shortages in imports and the depreciation in the local 
currency. Increased oil revenues thereafter have helped the monetary and fiscal policies to 
become more expansionary and also caused an increase in inflation. When the crisis started the 
Iranian currency lost its value significantly. 
2.6- The Iranian Exchange rate: 
Since 1979 the Iranian currency has depreciated significantly. Iran has experienced a variety 
of exchange rate regimes during this time, such as the fixed exchange rate or multiple exchange 
rate regimes. As in 1990 there was the official exchange rate for foreign transactions of the 
public sector, the competitive exchange rate for essential private imports and the floating 
exchange rate for other trades. The official and market exchange rates have been approximately 
the same from the start of 1979 but diverged soon after. Although they have reached the same 
rate over the years with major jumps a few times, such as when the unification of the exchange 
rates was tried in 2002. Overall the decreasing oil exports have had a downward effect on the 
currency. In the beginning of 2012 the market exchange rate depreciated by 25% and following 
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this the central bank depreciated the official exchange rate by 8 percent. and by the end of the 
year the Iranian currency depreciated significantly (Central Bank of Iran). 
The Central Bank of Iran has used the official exchange rate to control inflation, with respect 
to foreign asset stocks and imports. One of the characteristics of this exchange rate policy is 
the use of a multiple currency which is using different exchange rates such as the official 
exchange rate for essential imports and a floating exchange rate for other imports. In 1993 Iran 
determined there should be a unification of the exchange rate but this was later cancelled due 
to high inflation and excessive foreign debt. Another effort at unification was tried in 2002 
which also was not successful. The central bank tried to stabilize the market exchange rate 
through strict capital controls which were not successful. Iran’s official exchange rate has 
depreciated on average 18% annually since 1989 (Zahedi 2018). 
2.7- Sanctions and responses: 
Iran is facing three types of sanctions: unilateral US sanctions, UN sanctions and EU sanctions. 
The US sanctions have faced resistance from some countries like China and Russia and also 
the EU in some aspects. The first sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States were in 1980 
and since then further sanctions have been imposed on Iran’s economy in different ways. 
During 1989-1991 sanctions were relaxed and tightened again in 1993, followed by the Iran- 
Libya sanctions from 1996 to 2001 which imposed trade and financial sanctions on investment 
in the energy sector. This sanction was extended to non-US companies which was opposed by 
the EU. During 1999 and 2000 the trade sanctions eased because of more moderate policies 
from Iran. However, the Iran-Libya sanctions were renewed and tightened in 2001 until 2006 
in the Iran sanction Act and Libya was no longer included. The US extended and tightened 
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sanctions up to 2011 due to concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. Due to the imposed sanctions 
the share of the G7 countries declined significantly in Iran’s imports and the shares of China 
and the United Arab Emirate increased to fill the shortfall (Katzman 2021). 
Iran has responded to sanctions by seeking economic opportunities from other countries. With 
the withdrawal of the European and Western companies from the Iranian market, Iran has been 
expanding opportunities for trading with other countries, mostly from Eastern Europe, such as 
Belarus, Hungary, and Romania among others.  Iran has also created trading partners and 
alliances with Asian countries such as India, Japan, Singapore, and China. Recently China has 
become the main and largest trading partner with Iran. Since 2010, these partnerships have 
increased. 
In addition, the Iranian authorities have been shifting to gasoline supplies, which are considered 
more resistant to western and European economic sanctions. An empirical study by Marinov 
(2005) has revealed that Iran has a policy of diversifying its international trade routes in 
response to the economic sanctions. The expansion of non-oil export markets is another 
strategy used by Iran to respond to the economic sanctions imposed by the western countries 
(Kaempfer 1992). Since the 1990s, Iran started focusing on establishing and developing long-
term regional economic partnerships that specifically targets its oil industry (Pape 1998). 
Iran is also focusing on the development of its technologies and markets as a strategy of 
countering economic sanctions. The strategy has helped avoid triggering sanctions, as it does 
not engage with foreign partners. Iran has also been attempting to persuade the non-American 
firms to violate the sanctions. 
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Over the past few years, the USA, UN, and EU have imposed several economic sanctions on 
Iran mostly aimed at its oil sector. The intensity of the sanctions has increased with time. 
However, Iran has responded by establishing various strategies. 
Also, Iran’s oil exports and non-oil exports shifted from the US and Western Europe to Asian 
economies and Iran has found a new market for its exports. In 2005 and 2006, 56 percent of 
Iran’s oil exports were to Asian economies and 26 percent to Western Europe. UAE, Iraq, India 
and Japan have become the new destinations for its exports. Iran has also established free trade 
zones to facilitate trade with its neighbouring countries. So, US sanctions have slowed 
investments into the energy sector but have not stopped them. It is believed that the 
multinational sanctions have been more effective than unilateral US sanctions. The UN 
imposed sanctions on Iran in 2006 and 2007 aimed at the sensitive technologies for its nuclear 
program and financial assistance (IMF database).  
To make the sanctions less effective Iran has shifted its trade to Russia, Asia and the GCC 
countries and increased its trade with these countries continuously. Also, Asia has received a 
large share of the imports from Iran due to a lack of European trade. Although the US has 
imposed more financial pressure on these countries to prevent them trading with Iran. (United 
Arab Emirates and Dubai). Trading with Dubai has also been one of the main paths for Iran to 
bypass the US sanctions. High oil revenues have helped the Iranian economy and have been 
the source for financing the fiscal expansion. In 2014 Iran secured a contract to supply gas to 
Oman (IMF database). 
Iran’s oil export revenue has increased from 2005 to 2008 by 45 billion dollars. The large oil 
revenue has led to increased inflation. However, oil revenues have helped the Iranian 
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government to reverse the effects of sanctions. Although sanctions caused a decline in foreign 
investment in the energy and manufacturing sectors, oil revenues, however, helped the 
government to somewhat offset this shortfall by increasing domestic investment. Moreover, 
the government has used oil revenues to control the exchange rate from the financial shocks 
after the imposed sanctions. 
2.8- Events of imposed sanctions2: 
1980: US imposes sanctions on exports from the US to Iran which were lifted after a year. 
1984: US unilateral sanctions. US sanctions banned all US assistance to Iran and all weapon 
sales.   
1987: US banned imports from Iran and caused a 1-billion-dollar loss in export revenues 
1990s: Iran – Libya sanction in 1996 imposed by US. 
1991: Sanctions were reduced. 
1995: Sanctions imposed on US trade with Iran and also investments in Iran were imposed. 
Iran offered rewards for companies to invest in the oil sector. US investment in Iran’s energy 
sector was banned and also US trade with Iran were prohibited.   
1996: US tightened the sanctions targeting the oil sector and imports from the US were reduced 
to zero 
                                               
2 Dates collected from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 
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2000s: A number of US sanctions were imposed. However, in April 2000 the trade ban was 
relaxed for some imports from Iran. 
2006: In December 2006 the UN imposed economic and commercial sanctions against 10 
entities linked to nuclear programs and some financial assets were frozen. Also, the US 
extended sanctions. 
2007: An embargo was imposed on Iranian arms purchases and restrictions on loans to Iran 
(imposed by UN). US and EU were in favour of sanctions to prevent institutions/individuals 
from making financial commitments to Iran. 
2008 and 2010: UN sanctions were extended and new restrictions on Iranian investments were 
imposed.  
2010 to 2012: EU sanctions along with a number of US sanctions were imposed mostly on 
trade with Iran and a full ban on imports which was relaxed in 2000 was again renewed. 
Strict bans were imposed by the US on imports from Iran. Although EU sanctions did not 
include Iranian oil and gas imports. Japan and south Korea imposed the same sanctions as the 
EU. The UN also applied an intensification of former resolutions and penalties 
2011: Sanctions imposed on the Central bank of Iran and foreign banks dealing with Iran’s 
central bank. The UK and Canada stopped doing business with the Central Bank of Iran and 
Iranian financial institutions. The US sanctioned foreign banks that dealt with the Central Bank 
of Iran unless the country reduced the oil purchases significantly, this started in 2012. 
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July 2012: The EU imposed sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports and by October 2012 the 
currency was depreciated against a basket of foreign currencies. 
2013 to 2016: The removal of EU sanctions and suspension of some US sanctions. Although 
at the same time some sanctions were added by the US.  
2015: It was agreed that sanctions should be lifted, as Iran and its negotiating partners reached 
a deal on Iran’s nuclear future. 
2016: most UN sanctions were lifted. 
2018: US reinstated all sanctions against Iran 
2019: US announced that will sanction whoever deals with Iran or purchase its oil. 
2020: US imposed further sanctions on Iran's financial sector, targeting 18 Iranian banks and 
UN arms embargo expired. 
2.9-  The trend of the sanctions and their effects on GDP3: 
1977-78 to 1988-89: GDP dropped by 1.5 % a year on average. In this time period Iran 
experienced both US sanctions and the Iran-Iraq war and these affected the economy 
negatively. 
1989-90 to 1990-91: GDP experienced 7.2 % annual growth on average this occurred at the 
same time as a reduction in the sanctions imposed by US. 
                                               
3 Data collected from CBI, IMF and the World Bank 
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1977-78 to 1990-91: The share of aggregate consumption in GDP increased from 62% to 77%. 
 Oil production declined during the Iran-Iraq war and afterwards started to increase but still not 
as much as during the 1970s. 
The share of oil in GDP decreased in the 80s in comparison with the 70s due to a number of 
reasons such as: damage to oil equipment from the war, the decision to save oil reserves, low 
world oil prices, and a lack of technology in the oil sector. 
From 2004: An increase in Iranian GDP coincides with an increase in trade with China. Also 
Iran’s exports increased. 
From 1990, Iran started to have a close relationship with Russia: aircraft, submarines, 
investment in nuclear reactors (800m$), Caspian Sea oil (joint) (exploration and production). 
Iran engaged in an oil swap deal with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and started 





source: personal collection. 
While showing a slow but steady increase in the past 30 years, Iran's oil production started to 
decline in 2005 due to a lack of investment in developing current and new oil and gas fields. 
Iran's political circumstances and its buy-back scheme have deferred international oil 
companies trading and investing with Iran as the world's fourth largest oil reserves. 
Figure 2.6 presents the shift in Iran’s international trade. It shows Iran’s trade partners in 2001 
and 2009. As is shown, UAE is the largest trade partner in 2009. China and Germany are the 
other main trading partners regarding imports. There is no trade between Iran and the US during 
these years, because of the sanctions imposed by the US on Iran. Before imposing trade 



































































































Iran’s exports had reduced from 47% to 25%. This reduction could have been caused by the 
UN sanctions and extended US sanctions. China in particular is now Iran's biggest trade 
partner, while its share was only 1% of total exports before the imposing of export sanctions 
on Iran. 
Figure2.6: Trading History 
 
The annual Inflation rate in Iran from the Central Bank of Iran is shown in figure 2.7. The 
maximum inflation rate has been experienced in 1995 at 49.4%. According to the annual 
inflation data, another inflation peak was in 2008 and after a reduction in 2009 inflation 
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increased to around 30% in 2013 and in late 2014 it was reduced to 15.6 percent. According to 
the IMF, Iran is one of the top 10 countries with the highest inflation rate. 
Figure 2.7: Annual Inflation 
 
Source: World Bank; World Bank Source: International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and data files 
The high inflation is associated with output growth negatively.  
2.10- The Central bank of Iran: 
The Central Bank of Iran was established in 1960 and is a government organization. The main 
intentions of the central bank are facilitating trade transactions, controlling the value of the 
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currency, balance of payment equilibrium and economic growth. Iran’s banks follow the 
Islamic banking framework and apply an interest free framework (Zahedi et al. 2018).  
Islamic banking bans interest and the interest which is banned is a fixed or predetermined return 
on financial transactions. this does not include the uncertain return from profits. modern 
Islamic banking is working based on profit sharing. And modern Islamic banking is being used 
in Iran. In this study interest rate is referred to the profit sharing and interest is the term that is 
used in Iran. 
2.10.1- Monetary and Fiscal Policies: 
Having a large amount of natural resources, Iran’s economy has not developed as expected due 
to a number of different reasons such as a lack of beneficial monetary and fiscal policies due 
to international sanctions. For oil exporting countries such as Iran, increases in oil revenue or 
oil prices tend to cause fiscal policy expansions.  
Iran’s Government income is the sum of the oil income and taxes with oil income playing an 
important role in fiscal policy in Iran. Moreover, taxes do not have a significant role in 
government incomes. This can be determined from the oil income flow in the government 
budget (Amid, 1999). Oil and natural resources are the main source of revenue in Iran beside 
capital and financial assets and tax revenues.  
Another important factor in fiscal policy is Iran’s budget deficit. Iran has faced a substantial 
budget deficit for a long time and most of it involves borrowing from the Central bank of Iran 
which has also caused more inflation. Many researchers like Derakhshan, 2005, believe that 
fiscal indiscipline is a factor affecting the inflation rate after the revolution. Moreover, Fiscal 
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policies have a significant effect on GDP as noted by Rezaei 2004. One of the fiscal policies 
that was adopted by Iran was the rebalancing of revenues such as increasing non-distortionary 
taxes and lowering the oil revenue dependency. 
 In general, the Central Bank can adopt policies directly independent of market conditions or 
indirectly. Iran’s direct monetary policy tools are bank interest rate control and credit limits. 
Indirect tools include the central bank’s partnership bonds, legal deposits and special deposits 
from the banks held in the central bank. Liquidity is also an important factor in analysing 
monetary policies, as Iran has faced a high liquidity growth. The liquidity peaked at a 58% rise 
in 1974 and reached the minimum of 6% in 1984. On average, the liquidity increased by 28% 
annually from 1973 to 2006. This growth rate has been one factor that caused inflation to rise 
(Hadian 2008). 
The money supply has experienced an increasing trend especially after 1997. One of the direct 
monetary tools that the Central Bank of Iran can use is through the banking profit rate which 
is determining the profit rate or banking facilities’ expected rate of return, also minimum and 
maximum profit rates or investments’ expected rate of return. The Central Bank is authorized 
to determine the bank’s profits, which affects the credit markets and interest rate and these 
policies in turn affect economic factors such as inflation. (Hadian 2008). Iran has attempted 
several fiscal reforms, mainly to reduce the budget deficit which included some revenue 
generating measures like changes in the tax rules, expenditure savings and public enterprises. 




Trade liberalization has been a part of Iran’s economic reforms. This has resulted in an increase 
in imports and exports. The policy of fixing the exchange rate while inflation rate was high, 
helped imports and the export of resource-based commodities increased significantly. During 
the 1980s the exchange rate was mostly fixed, which is the same time that there were negative 
shocks and this resulted in an overvalued currency (Central Bank of Iran). 
Iran’s financial and economic sanctions and short run external debt forced the government to 
withdraw the exchange rate unification. In 1995 a dual exchange rate system was proposed. 
One is the official exchange rate which was fixed to 1,750 Rial per US dollar for oil and gas 
exports and essential imports. The second one is the export exchange rate which was fixed at 
3000 Rial per US dollar for non-oil exports and non-essential imports. Alongside the official 
rates there was the black-market exchange rate. The Central Bank of Iran kept the fixed 
exchange rate policy for some years (2002-2010). 
One of the Central Bank of Iran’s policy goals was price stability which was not successful and 
over the past years average inflation in Iran has been about 20%. A lack of monetary 
instruments and fiscal policy dominance are some of the reasons that monetary policy has failed 
in Iran and the fiscal deficit has been financed by borrowing from the central bank. Government 
has been unable to collect taxes from some institutions and borrowed from market lenders and 
decreased the subsidies on energy. As a result, the money supply increased to fill the gap in the 
budget. Due to Islamic banking and a poor financial sector, the central bank has limited 
monetary instruments (Zahedi and Azadi 2018). 
Some of the factors that have caused the banking system problems are fiscal dominance, 
corruption, institutional weakness and immorality in the system. The central bank of Iran was 
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established in 1960 and is a government organisation, but after the revolution it is working with 
an Islamic finance framework which includes the concept of non-interest-bearing instruments 
so predetermined payments are not allowed such as interest and this restricts the funds to a 
profit and loss sharing basis. After the Iran-Iraq war, Iran aimed to introduce some structural 
reforms that involved exchange rate unification, price liberalization and privatization. This 
reform was successful at first but then the economy faced stagflation due to US sanctions, 
foreign debts, oil price reduction as in figure 8 below and significant liquidity growth leading 
to inflation. Then in 1995 the exchange rate unification and price liberalization were reversed. 
The Central Bank of Iran determines the external debt in US dollars.  
 According to the economic data from CBI and IMF from 1999 to 2005 there was an expansion 
in the economy due to increased oil prices and less tension with Western countries, inflation 
dropped by a half and GDP increased. From 2005 to 2013 there was energy price reforms which 
were ineffective in the end. A direct cash transfer program which started in 2011, was 
successful initially but as the payments did not adjust with inflation it failed. After removing 
energy subsidies, a direct transfer cash program was stablished as replacement for energy 
subsidies which was around 15% of GDP. These transfers were paid directly to individuals 
who were in the bottom one-third of the income distribution. However, these direct cash 




Figure 3.8: OPEC crude oil price per barrel: 
 
Source: OPEC and IMF database 
Also, Corruption and poor planning caused the failure of the reforms. Financial institutions 
started to grow and as a result liquidity demand increased and interest rates increased and so 
banks faced more pressure. In 2012 sanctions were imposed on Iran which targeted the banks 
and the central bank of Iran helped the decline of the financial system to accelerate. In 2013 
sanctions reduced the oil exports and this reduction along with a decrease in oil prices reduced 
oil export revenue more. In 2015 after joining Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was 
an agreement to limit the nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions, inflation decreased 




2.10.2- Five years development plans: 
From 1989 to 1994, the first five-year economic plan was implemented. The main aims of the 
first five-year plan was to eliminate some nontariff trade limits, develop Iran’s infrastructure, 
reduce inflation and liberalize the exchange rate system (Valadkhani 2001). During this period 
of time GDP growth was 7 % annually and the targeted growth was 8 percent. Moreover, 
imports increased from 13 billion US dollars to 31 billion US dollars. Iran was not able to repay 
the external debt and the government decided to reduce its imports as a result. However, despite 
the policy of limiting imports and also increases in non-oil exports the deficit remained high 
(Valadkhani 2001). 
The first five-year plan was based on expansionary fiscal policies. However, after the oil price 
decreased the government used external borrowing and caused a significant increase in foreign 
debt. From 1995 to 2000 the second five-year plan was established and followed further 
liberalization policies as in the first plan. During these years the economy experienced gradual 
and slow growth, but lower than the targeted rate. the second plan also increased Iran’s foreign 
debt.  
The third five-year plan was from 2000 to 2005 and aimed at principally budget and tax 
reforms, greater transparency in the macroeconomy, privatization and transition from a 
monopoly to competitive markets.  The growth during this period of time was acceptable and 
also increased oil prices helped government revenues, but the privatization plan was not 
successful (Central Bank of Iran). 
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The fourth five-year development plan was between 2005 and 2010. Some of the aims of this 
plan were increased economic growth, reduced inflation, increased non-oil exports and reduced 
oil export dependency and privatization. During the fourth plan the growth was not as expected 
and was significantly below the target growth of 8 percent. There was a reduction in inflation 
due to the central bank’s tightened credit policy. There was also a decline in liquidity growth 
during the global financial crisis. From 2011 to 2016 the fifth five-year development plan was 
established. The fifth plan was aimed at optimising of industrial production to reduce the oil 
dependency. 
2.11-  Triadic sanctions theory: 
Triadic sanctions have a distinguishing difference from other sanctions, which have a sender 
or senders and a receiver, the receiver is the actual target. The receiver of the sanction is not 
the actual target but a potential sender, so the original sender punishes the target. Considering 
Iran, the receiver are foreign entities investing in or trading with Iran rather than Iran. In theory, 
in this way the US can hurt Iran more than if it targeted it directly. 
We have 3 players, leading sender (U), target (I) and third party (C). In the case of Iran, the 
target is Iran, sender can be the US and the third party are the foreigners who if they do trading 
and investing with Iran will be fined. The level of compliance Ki affects the sender payoff. 
!" = $%&(()*+&) ,  +& is the total expected gain from trade for the target and ()* is the sender’s 
trade share in the target country. (-) is the target country market share in the third country and 
(-* is the sender country market share in the third country. The	(*-  is the third country market 
share in the sender country and lastly the  (*)    is the share of target country in the sender 
country. The target should pay the cost of−$(!0) (Han, 2012). 
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!1 = $%&((&2 + (&4)+&)  
Table 2.2:  
 
Source: Han (2012) 
Considering Iran and US sanctions, the !5 is an exogenous level of !0, a level of compliance 
that the US wants from Iran. We know that previously, the dyadic sanction has not worked. 
Therefore, we can conclude !"<!5. Assuming !"<!5<!1, then If the triadic sanction had 
worked, US could get!5. 
The maximum level of !0for the US is !" which is not good enough. So, the triadic sanction 
was not effective.  
The minimum 67 (punishment level p between 0 and one and67 p2, when I rejects !1and C 
trades with I, U punishes C by reducing trade by 67 = 	
89:
8:;
 ). This is required so that the third 
party has to comply depending on the trade dependency of the third party and the sender and 
the target country and maximum punishment that the sender imposes depends on the level of 
its trade with the third party. 
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Figure 2.9: The Game Tree 
 
Source: Han (2012) 
In Han (2012), which studies the structure of triadic sanctions through a simple game, he has 
shown that economic sanctions in general make full use of triadic relationships: the US (A) 
threatens to restrict a third country’s (C) US market access if it exports refined petroleum to 
Iran (B).  
 It is shown that countries B and C both will experience a loss in welfare vis-a-vis the pre-
sanction days when C succumbs to such a threat. Such triadic sanctions are especially effective 
when there is not a strong trade or investment relationship between the target and the sanction 
sender. Even if the sender’s market share of the target country market is big enough, in such a 
globalized market like todays, there will be another country that is willing to take the imposer’s 
place.  
Han (2012) shows that depending on the third party’s economic reliance on the US or Iranian 
market, there are eager third parties of the sanctions like Korean and Japanese firms, and less-
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eager third parties like Chinese ones. Moreover, depending on the US’s dependency on the 
third party’s firms, the level of sanction enforcement varies and all in all third parties continue 
their businesses with Iran and the actual effectiveness of the sanctions can be undermined. 
Based on anecdotal evidence of the triadic theory the US sanctions imposed on Iran are not 
effective. However, this theory has been examined statistically using the FE panel estimation 
in a few studies such as Early (2012) which indicated that sanctions effectiveness is not 
significant as it was expected.  
.  
2.12-  An Offer Curve Analysis: 
The extent of the trade relationships between the country which imposes the sanctions and the 
target country determines if the target country can find alternative traders easily. Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (1992, 1999) studied the effect of trade sanctions on the price of imports and 
exports using offer curves. These show the quantity of one product that a country exports for 
the quantity of another good that the country will import. Using the offer curve to see the 
sanction’s effect can also show the welfare effect of sanctions. 
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Figure 2.10: Offer Curve 
 
Source: Han (2012) 
Figure 2.10 shows an offer curve equilibrium between a targeted economy for sanctions (T) 
and current trade partners, in this case all other economies (W). <= is the quantity of export 
goods for economy T and >= is the imports. Points on T’s offer curve show the international 
trade equilibrium for T. The terms of trade are shown by the slope of the line from the origin 
to a point on the offer curve. As we move along the curve welfare increases. It is assumed that 
the target’s export is the sender’s import and the target’s import is the sender’s export. 
<?=>=, >?=<=    (2.1) 
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We assume that T is the only supplier of <=. And the intersection of the two offer curves, E, is 
the international trade equilibrium. 
Imposing multilateral sanctions on T: 
Imposing multilateral sanctions cancels the trade between W and T. It forces T to move from 
E to an autarky situation at the origin and worsens the terms of trade from @5 to @1. An autarky 
position will also apply for W, so the terms of trade will shift to @A. Welfare will worsen for 
both the target and sender. 
For the sender the shift in the terms of trade tends to increase the price of their net importable 
goods. For the target the opposite occurs and the shift in the terms of trade reduces the price of 
its net exportable good. The amount the terms of trade moves depends on the curvature of the 
offer curve, which is a function of the price elasticity and the size of the trading countries. 
Very large countries have little curvature and do not suffer from a loss of trading due to 
sanctions. In contrast, small countries depend a lot on trade. They are price inelastic (demand 
and supply) and suffer a lot from sanctions. Their offer curve has more curvature. 
The economic effect of unilateral sanctions: 
By imposing unilateral sanctions from a sanctioning country S, the rest of the world will have 
a new offer curve R. The rest of the world’s offer to trade is reduced because S’s offer is 
removed from W and elasticity is reduced, and so R has more curvature. Because of the 
existence of other countries to trade with, the target country does not go into an autarky 
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situation, but the terms of trade worsen to t*. As the number of sanctioning countries increases, 
we get to autarky and the terms of trade shifts to @1. 
To conclude both sender and target countries will be worse off by the imposition of sanctions. 
“The degree to which the sanctions impose costs on these nations depends on the number and 
size of the other countries willing to continue trading and on the elasticities of the trade offers 
of those countries.” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007, p.875). Although I am not testing the 
specific hypotheses based on the above model, it suggests that under certain circumstances 
sanctions have little effect on the target’s macroeconomy, so my aim is to determine if the 
above model is correct in suggesting sanctions are ineffective or whether this is not the case. 
 
2.13- Conclusion: 
Iran’s economy transformed from an agricultural economy to industrial economy and was 
involved in global markets. Moreover, Iran started to engage in trade within the global market. 
Iran is an important member of OPEC and had been under different kinds of sanctions imposed 
by different countries and mostly by the US since 1979 and this has caused fluctuations in 
important factors of Iran’s macroeconomy, including GDP and inflation. Iran has a multiple 
exchange rate regime, with constant depreciations being experienced by these exchange rates, 
which have potentially kept the Iranian economy competitive and limited the adverse effects 








Chapter 3: A VAR model for the Iranian economy 
3.1-  Introduction: 
Oil and gas income play an important strategic role in the Iranian economy. Iran holds 11 
percent of the world’s oil reserves and is the second largest oil producer among the OPEC. Any 
shock to the global oil market can have a significant effect on the economy because of the high 
dependency of the Iranian economy on oil revenues. Since 1960 the oil production effect on 
the Iranian economy rose gradually and in 1974, the oil export revenue to GDP ratio increased 
to 47%. Although, there was a decline between 1979 and 1988 due to the revolution and Iran-
Iraq war, it started to increase gradually afterwards with the average ratio of 20%. Before 1960 
oil exports accounted for 50% of the total exports (Esfahani 2009) and increased gradually 
thereafter. The unique role of oil revenues in the structure of the government budgets and social 
security programs distinguishes the Iranian economy from other economies. 
Even with high oil prices and revenues the government budget deficits are still a challenging 
issue, which can be because of the huge subsidies on the energy and food sector. Oil revenues 
are the main source of subsidies and are controlled by the government, so we can conclude that 
subsidies are affected indirectly by the oil market. The other main issue in Iran’s economy is 
53 
 
the potential for an appreciation of the real exchange rate during the oil boom of the 1970s 
which lead to a trade sector contraction which is known as the Dutch disease. (Wijnbergen 
(1984)). 
The government is the sole receiver of petro-dollars and is the largest supplier and demander 
of foreign exchange, so the government controls the official exchange rate. The government 
controls the official exchange rate and this causes a gap between the official and market 
exchange rates. This can be a source for rent-seeking (figure 3.1). Figure 3.2 shows the stacked 
line graph for the market and official exchange rate. The stacked line graph displays the trends 
in the data and helps to compare the trends and patterns. In fact, the lines are cumulative at 
each point in this kind of graph. The blue line is the official exchange rate and the orange line 
is the free exchange rate. 
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Figure 3.1: official (blue) and market (Orange) exchange rate 
 


































































































































































































































































Figure 3.2: official (blue) and market (Orange) exchange rate 
 
Source: personal collection  
The currency weakened significantly in 2002 and 2013 after the 2012 sanctions were 
implemented. 
Imposing sanctions on Iran has attracted considerable attention from the international 
community since 2003, as the United States (US), the United Nations (UN) and the European 
Union (EU) have imposed severe sanctions on Iran. In this chapter I try to analyse the western 
sanctions on Iran and their impact on Iran’s economy. This study tries to answer one of the 
most important questions in recent years, “what are the impacts if any of western multilateral 
sanctions on Iran’s economy?” 
The aim of this analysis is to determine the interaction between the oil sector and the Iranian 
macroeconomy as a whole, the Iranian government’s main source of income is from national 
































































































































































































































































international monetary fund (IMF) reported that 63% of government budget comes from oil 
and gas export revenues. During times of sanctions on oil exports, the country can hardly sell 
its oil and this can cause economic problems. This analysis does not include the interest rate as 
a measure of monetary policy following (Pesaran et al. 2009). This is because of the fact that 
domestic credit markets in Iran are controlled by the government and the rate is not market 
determined. Also due to Islamic banking. 
3.2- Previous literature: 
3.2.1- Developed countries: 
The primary work on the effects of oil prices on a developed economy such as the US was 
initiated by Darby (1982). One of the most influential studies in this area is the work of 
Hamilton (1983), who used a VAR framework for the US economy and found that oil prices 
affect US GNP negatively and oil price shocks are important factors in explaining the US 
recessions from 1949 to 1973. By using the VAR model, Burbidge and Harrison (1984) 
investigated the impact of oil prices on five OECD countries. For industrial production, they 
found that the price of oil applies a sizeable influence on the U.S. and the U.K., but the 
responses in other countries are quite small. In another study, Gisser and Goodwin (1986) and 
Mork (1989) studied the effects of oil prices in developing countries. Furthermore, Mork and 
Olsen (1994) investigated the relationship between oil price fluctuations and GDP for seven 
industrialized countries, while, Lee and Ni (1995) and Ferderer (1996) also used a VAR model 
like most of the other papers to investigate the effects of oil prices. Federer (1996) found that 
oil price volatility boosts forecasts of industrial production. Hess (2000) analysed the US 
economy and found that oil price shocks implied lower GDP prior to the 1980s. He concluded 
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that oil price spikes are generally short-lived and may not have a direct effect on the US 
economy. He found that the oil spikes of 1973 and 1979 caused downturns in the US economy.  
Papapetrou (2001) was another who used the VAR approach and estimated the relationship 
between oil prices, stock returns, interest rates, economic activity and employment in Greece. 
Papapetrou’s analysis showed that an oil price shock has a negative effect on employment. 
Increasing costs of production resulting in lower output and lower levels of employment. 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) studied the effect of oil price shocks on economic 
activities in seven OECD countries, Norway and the Euro area. They found that oil price 
increases have more impact on GDP growth rather than oil price decreases.  In addition, they 
found that oil price increases have a negative effect on the economies of oil importing countries 
and mixed effects for the oil exporting countries. 
In a paper about monetary policy and the transmission of oil price shocks in the US, Bachmeier 
(2008) utilized a VAR model and daily observations of oil prices and stock returns and found 
a negative relationship between oil shocks and stock returns. 
Moreover, Blanchard and Gali (2010) compared current responses of inflation and output, 
using the SVAR and IRF analysis, to oil price shocks in a group of industrialized economies 
on data starting in the 1970s. Their model uses quarterly data from 1970 to 2007, and 
demonstrates that the main reasons for the weak responses of these economies in later years 
are the reduced energy/oil consumption per unit of output, more flexible labour markets, and 
the progress in the implementation of monetary policies. 
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3.2.2- Developing countries: 
Most studies do not analyse the developing oil exporting countries, they are mostly about 
developed oil exporters and they do not include the natural resource abundant economies in 
their empirical analyses mostly due to a lack of data in these countries. There are a number of 
studies about the macroeconomic effects of resource discovery which have focused on the 
Dutch disease such as Krugman (1987). The Dutch disease was first experienced in the 1960s 
in the Netherlands after the discovery of gas. According to the Dutch disease, an exogenous 
increase in revenues from resources, will result in an exchange rate appreciation and a reduction 
in the output and employment of other goods. Along with the literatures on the resource curse 
hypothesis there is some literature which argues that the resource curse does not exist such as 
Brunnschweiler (2008). They show that resource abundance is significantly associated with 
growth. The recent literature on resource rich countries focuses on the political economy 
aspects and suggests that unexpected gains from resources can create rent-seeking that include 
corruption (Mauro 1995, Leite and Weidmann 1999). 
The relationship between Iran’s oil sector and its macroeconomy has recently been the subject 
of a number of empirical studies. The empirical evidence reported in the literature is based 
mostly on estimated VAR models and impulse response functions and variance decomposition 
analysis. There is an empirical consensus that negative oil shocks have larger effects than 
positive oil shocks on the economies of oil-exporting countries as reported by Emami and 
Adibpour (2012) and Mehrara (2007) which analysed the oil price relationship, and the same 
applies to Iran (Farzanegan and Markwardt 2009) which is in contrast to studies about 
developed economies e.g. Hamilton (2003). 
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The studies about the Iranian economy have mostly analysed the oil price shocks while I am 
analysing the effects of oil export changes and considering the sanctions imposed on Iran which 
mainly targeted the oil exports.  
Mehrara, Oskoui (2007) studied the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in oil exporting 
countries for four oil exporting countries: Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia by the 
VAR approach. They used data from 1970 to 2002 for oil prices, output, the exchange rate, and 
the consumer price index. They concluded that external shocks play an important role in 
explaining the fluctuations of output in Iran and Saudi Arabia, but not in Kuwait and Indonesia, 
so the real output is vulnerable to the changes in oil prices. 
Also, Reyes-Loya and Blanco (2008) analysed the Mexican economy, focusing on the 
government spending, tax revenues, oil revenues and the industrial production index by using 
an ARIMA model for monthly data from 1990 to 2005. They found an inverse relationship 
between oil-related revenues and tax revenue from non-oil sources. Their results suggest a 
substitution effect between oil duties and tax revenue, conforming to the findings of Tijerina-
Guajardo and Pagan (2003). 
Mehrara (2008) examined the asymmetric effects of positive and negative oil price shocks on 
industrial production in 13 oil exporting countries. He studied the annual data for the period 
1965-2004 and found that the negative oil revenue shocks dominate the positive shocks, and 
negative oil price shocks have a negative effect on the output growth. However, positive oil 
price shocks have less influence on the economic growth.  
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Jbir and Zouari- Ghorbel (2009) used the VAR approach to study the relationship between the 
oil prices and the Tunisian economy from 1993 to 2007. The results show that there is no direct 
impact of oil price shocks on economic activity, and the effects of shocks are transmitted 
significantly through government spending. 
Chun (2010), studied oil prices and military spending, He estimated the elasticity of demand 
for military spending in five oil producing economies, namely Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, and Nigeria, using annual data from 1997 to 2007. He concluded that each of these 
countries show a mainly inelastic demand for military spending, and these countries expanded 
military spending even when they faced a reduction in oil revenues. Chun (2010) mentioned 
that aiming to limit defence spending through imposing sanctions to reduce the oil revenue of 
the oil exporter country are mostly not successful.   Therefore, he disagreed with the economic 
sanctions on the oil exports of Iran. This is in contrast with Farzanegan (2010).  
Berument et al. (2010) studied oil shock effects in selected MENA countries, this investigation 
included an analysis of oil price shocks in terms of the real exchange rate, inflation and output, 
using the VAR and IRF approaches for 16 countries for annual data from 1952 to 2004. The 
results show that oil price shocks have a statistically significant and positive effect on the 
outputs of the mostly oil exporting countries such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, 
Qatar, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates and no significant effect on the other economies 
such as Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.  
In their paper about macroeconomic dynamics in oil exporting countries, Mehrara and 
Moghadam (2011) used a panel VAR model. Their study indicated that in the oil exporting 
countries, separating the real economic sector from the oil prices is one of the critical objectives 
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of the government. This is what is done in some developed oil exporter countries such as 
Norway. Their study includes 12 OPEC members and 8 non-OPEC developing oil exporters 
between 1985 and 2009. They found that oil price shocks are not necessarily inflationary. They 
found that money is not neutral in these countries and it is the main cause of macroeconomic 
fluctuation. And also, oil price shocks significantly affect economic output and the money 
supply. They concluded that in addition to oil price shocks, domestic shocks such as to output 
and money can have a sizeable influence on oil prices in the world market. 
Esfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2012) indicate that there is a long-lasting positive impact of 
oil revenues on GDP for oil-exporting countries including Iran’s economy. They also confirm 
the long run relationship between total energy consumption, GDP and the consumer price index 
as reported by Ghorbani et al. (2007).  The Esfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2012) analysis 
confirms Mehrara’s (2008-2009) results for other oil-exporting countries. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) and Emami and Adibpour (2012) focused on the 
relationship between government expenditure and oil prices. Both studies show the same result 
which is the positive effect of oil price shocks on government expenditures in Iran. they 
determined that oil price shocks affect output in the same direction so positive and negative oil 
shocks increase and decrease the output growth respectively. 
 In the SVAR analysis by Emami and Adibpour (2012), positive and negative oil price shocks 
do not affect output growth in Iran in the same way, as the short run effects are asymmetric: 
while negative shocks adversely affect economic performance, the impact of positive shocks 




3.2.2.1- A brief exposition of studies about Iran: 
Ghorbani et al. (2007) studied the relationship between macroeconomic indexes and energy 
consumption in Iran. The results show that there is a long run relationship between total energy 
consumption, GNP and the price index. In the short run total energy consumption increases by 
increases in the price index and GDP, and the same relationship exists in the long run for these 
two factors. 
Considering the Iranian economy, the Esfahani et al. (2012) results fail to find any evidence of 
the Dutch disease, although their study focuses on short run and temporary resources by 
developing a long run growth model under the assumption of a long-lasting impact of oil 
revenue. While Emami found results that can be explained by the resource curse and indicated 
that positive oil price shocks have the least effect on output, which confirms the resource curse 
hypothesis. And similarly, Farzanegan and Markwardt confirm the Dutch disease and resource 
curse. We can conclude that there is not a consensus on the existence of the Dutch disease in 
the Iranian economy due to the fact that there is significant depreciation in the exchange rate. 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) have studied the effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian 
economy, by analysing the relationship between oil price changes and macroeconomic 
variables in Iran using a VAR model. The results are in contrast to the results for developed 
economies, for example Hamilton (2003) and Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) as 
positive oil shocks have a larger impact on GDP than negative shocks. In theory the Iranian 
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economy is much more vulnerable to the negative oil price shocks than positive shocks, due to 
its dependence on oil revenue.  
 The asymmetric effects of oil price shocks, both positive and negative shocks to oil prices have 
inflationary effects on the economy. The increase in oil prices however has a positive effect on 
industrial output. The impulse response functions in this study show that positive oil price 
changes have a significant and positive effect on inflation, industry output and real imports. 
The negative oil price shocks have a significant and negative effect on industry output, real 
effective exchange rate and real imports. 
The Esfahani, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2009) paper examined the relationship between oil 
exports and the Iranian economy and developed a long run growth model for a major oil-
exporting economy while assuming the lasting impact of oil revenues. The study’s findings are 
in contrast to the evidence of Dutch disease which focuses on short run and temporary 
resources. 
They found that in the long run, real output is affected by oil exports and foreign output. They 
also show that the Iranian economy adjusts quite quickly to the shocks in foreign output and 
oil exports, which could be due to the underdeveloped nature of Iran’s financial markets. They 
report a significant negative long run relationship between inflation and GDP and they take it 
as evidence of the inefficiency of the Iranian economy. 
Emami and Adibpour (2012) paper on oil income shocks and economic growth in Iran 
investigates the relationship between oil revenue shocks and output growth in Iran for the 1959-
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2008 period. They attempt to find how output growth, government expenditure, the money 
supply and the real exchange rate respond to oil revenue shocks in Iran via an SVAR model. 
 Their results show that the oil revenue shocks significantly affect output growth 
asymmetrically in the same direction.  Positive and negative oil revenue shocks increase and 
decrease output respectively, and the negative shocks have a larger effect than positive shocks. 
This can be explained by the resource curse. The research records that by increasing oil 
revenues the output growth slow down due to the resource curse and volatility in public 
balances.  
Positive oil shocks have a positive effect on government expenditure and the money supply 
while negative shocks have a negative effect, a pattern which indicates the high dependence of 
these two elements on oil revenue shocks. The result agrees with Mahara (2008), Mahrara 
(2009) for some oil-exporting countries.  
Positive oil price shocks have the least significant effect on output, which confirms the resource 
curse hypothesis. These results suggest that government expenditure and money supply and 
therefore the fiscal and monetary policies have a high dependence on oil revenue shocks that 
are determined exogenously. In addition, positive oil shocks are the most important factor for 
the real exchange rate, which conforms to Farzanegan and Markwardt’s (2009) results. 
Farzanegan (2010) studied the impact of oil revenue shocks on government spending in Iran. 
He estimated a model to examine the dynamic effects of oil revenue shocks on Iran’s 
government expenditure. The results show that military and security spending is significantly 
affected by oil price changes while social expenditures has no significant reaction. 
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3.3-  Sanctions: 
Initial US sanctions were imposed in 1980 on exports from the US to Iran and were lifted after 
one year. Again, another set of sanctions was imposed in 1984 by the US In 1987 when the US 
banned imports from Iran and caused a 1-billion-dollar loss in export revenues (Emami 2012). 
Even though subsequently in 1991 the sanctions were lightened. A few years later sanctions 
imposed by the US were tightened. In 1995 Iran offered rewards for companies to invest in the 
oil sector.  
The UN also imposed some sanctions on Iran. There were four series of sanctions imposed by 
the United Nations. UN sanctions started in 2006 and in 2007 an embargo was imposed on 
Iranian arms purchases and restrictions on loans to Iran. In 2008 and 2010 the UN sanctions 
were extended and new restrictions on Iranian investments were imposed. In 2012 the EU 
imposed sanctions. 
Because of the sanctions, Iran tried to find new trade partners and also to reduce its dependency 
on oil as an oil-based economy and so Iran started to negotiate to lift the sanctions after 2014 
and an agreement was finally reached in 2015. Some believe that sanctions are not that 
effective, as It is believed that in the long run the sanctions force the target country to find new 
trade partners, so there arises the question of whether the sanctions affected the economy or 
not and if they had, to what extent sanctions affected the economy.  
3.4- The Theory behind Iran’s sanctions: 
Since the 1990s, sanctions have become a common tool for the politicians, especially in the 
US. Maloney (2010) and Leoffler (2009) believe that financial sanctions have hurt North Korea 
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and Iran by increasing the price of imports. However, financial sanctions were not acting as a 
privilege at the bargaining table. Kahn (2006) believes that for North Korean sanctions, China’s 
fuel oil was the only factor that has been effective. 
Many studies have suggested that sanctions are not effective. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 
(2007) found that only 34% of sanctions were partially successful and reported that sanctions 
often do not work, although, Pape (1997) reported 5% success.  Contrary to these findings, 
Drezner (2003) suggests that selection bias is a problem in these studies, as game theory 
indicates sanctions to be more efficient at the threat level than when they are imposed. 
US sanction on imports from Iran in 1987 did not significantly affect Iran’s exports and they 
reached 2.6 barrels per day in the 1990s. We can conclude that the lack of multilateral sanctions 
was not a success in preventing oil exports and Iran easily sold its oil to other countries. 
Therefore, the country continued to rely on the oil revenue. Also, in 1996 the Iran Libya Act 
which expanded sanctions to non-US companies was not successful for the same reasons as 
before and European and Asian companies continued their trade with Iran. UN sanctions were 
imposed between 2006 and 2010 and focused on inhibiting the nuclear program rather than 
undermining the economy. 
 The IMF reported that oil sanctions on Iran could raise oil prices by 30%, so analysts believed 
that imposing oil sanctions on Iran would not be successful (e.g. Van de Graaf (2013)). 
However, after imposing oil sanctions in 2012, oil prices remained stable in 2012 and 2013. 
Iran’s increasing trade relations with China have kept its imports as well as its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) rising. China’s share of exports to Iran recently equalled US exports to Iran 
before the revolution 
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In 2012, Iran’s banks were expelled from the SWIFT banking transaction system and were 
isolated from the international banking system. In addition, assets worth tens of billions of 
dollars were frozen. As major Western foreign investments slowed, it was primarily the private 
sector that suffered. However, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development estimated that 
direct foreign investment in Iran is increasing, funded primarily by the Chinese, Russian and 
Turkish companies. 
While Iran holds the fourth largest oil reserves worldwide, its oil production was hurt because 
the oil exports were capped and prices fell. Furthermore, in 2012 and 2013, Iran’s GDP 
contracted and inflation increased in 2013. The government controls large segments of the 
economy and corruption is also high in Iran. It should be noted however that the government 
managed to keep the overall poverty rate in Iran below one percent, which is a remarkable 
achievement under the given circumstances. 
Iran made a deal with the US in 2013 and 2015 so that the sanctions were dropped. The deal 
was that Iran moderated its nuclear program so that Iran could not produce nuclear weapons 
but it would be allowed to have enough uranium for the energy needs of the country. Even 
before a deal had been reached, Tehran had managed to bypass the sanctions in some areas, 
such as by laundering cash through Dubai. The other way was that Iranians arrived in Dubai 
with suitcases full of cash and converted it into U.S. dollars in order to enter the international 
financial markets. Iran’s trade partners such as Russia, China, and Turkey have a significant 
interest in ending sanctions so that they can expand their trade with Iran (Feiler 2015). 
China has become a key trade partner for Iran, enabling it to circumvent sanctions. Since the 
International Sanctions, Iran’s GDP has increased, this can relate to increases in global oil 
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prices and new trade partners. Iran ‘s GDP could be defined as a reflection of its oil revenues 
(Abolhassan Banisadr 2010). The IMF (2011) reported that “the rebounding in international 
oil prices benefits Iran.” In other words, increasing the world oil prices have reduced the impact 
of the sanctions on Iran’s economy for some years. However, this reason may not be true after 
imposing sanctions on the oil sector in 2012. 
Figure 3.3: GDP in US Dollars 
 
Reviewing the theory of sanctions, some studies suggest that sanctions are a successful way to 
reach the target while others focus on the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions due to the 
demands of the sender being hard to meet, and consequently claim that economic sanctions fail 
as a foreign policy tool (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988, 1998; George 1991; Nossal 1994; 
Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drury 1998; Hufbauer et al. 2008). For example, in a recent 
New York Times article, Krauss (August 12, 2014) mentioned that Iran is decreasing the effect 




The Iranian government has taken every possible action to neutralize the sanctions, such as 
offering trade concessions to other countries that are willing to do business with Iran. Oil has 
played an important role. The high price of oil has been beneficial for Iran since 2002. The 
high oil revenue has led to economic growth. Also, high oil revenue has helped the government 
to stabilize the exchange rate. 
The major impact of sanctions on Iran’s exports and imports has been changing trading partners 
and the use of re-export strategies for imports and exports. Iran’s efforts to compensate for the 
sanctions led to an increase in trade with Turkey and the GCC countries. So, Iran found 
substitutes for European and US companies that are unable or not willing to trade with Iran. 
Also, Dubai let the banned companies’ trade with Iran indirectly (Katzman 2013). Although 
these partnerships were restricted after 2008 with US pressure. But smuggling has been 
increased. Iran also decided the use of a bartering system to export oil to some countries 
because of the sanctions on the SWIFT system and substitution of gold for the Dollar (Katzman 
2013). 
3.5- Data and Methodology: 
The vector autoregression model (VAR) is one of the most simple, successful and flexible 
approaches for the analysis of multivariate time series. Enders (1995) believes the VAR model 
is a useful approach to studying endogenous variables and has proven to be useful for studying 
the dynamic relationship between multiple variables. 
The VAR model is used for policy analysis and structural inference, along with data description 
and forecasting. In the VAR approach all variables are considered as endogenous. One of the 
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advantages of the VAR model is the ability to present the Granger causality test which 
demonstrates the direction of the variables’ causality. I have used this approach to examine 
whether my variables can have significant impacts on each other. One of the other advantages 
of the VAR model which is practical for my research is that it does not impose restrictions. The 
imposed sanctions on the oil sector represents a shock to the oil sector in the VAR models of 
the Iranian economy (Farzanegan, 2011). I have examined whether the oil revenue shocks 
affect the other key macroeconomic variables. The VAR approach can be used to determine 
the dynamic relationship between these variables. 
The vector autoregressive approach is one of the most useful models to describe the dynamic 
behaviour of the economy and also the most successful model. The other advantages of VAR 
model to other models is that It is also flexible and easy to use and does not make assumptions 
about the endogeneity of the variables, as all are treated as being endogenous. In addition, I am 
using an unrestricted VAR, as I aim to determine the overall effects of the sanctions on the 
economic variables, rather than impose specific restrictions. The VAR model is used in this 
section to analysis the effect of important macroeconomic indicators on the Iranian economy 
and to investigate the effect of shocks on the economy. In addition to the impulse response 
functions, I have also used variance decomposition analysis to demonstrate the contribution of 
relevant variables to explaining the fluctuations in macroeconomic variables.  
In this research I have used the most important macroeconomic variables for an oil exporting 
country such as oil exports, GDP, inflation and imports. In addition, I have added the budget 
deficit to my variables which can affect inflation and output. Jafari et al (2006) found a negative 
relationship between budget deficits and economic growth in the long run. However, in the 
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short-term the government may run a deficit to gain some goals for example, to fund public 
investment. Also, I have investigated the exchange rate which is one of the most crucial 
macroeconomic elements. It effects the current and future economic development. The 
exchange rate affects international trade, capital flows and production and consumption. An 
unstable exchange rate will raise uncertainty and the risks of the domestic and foreign 
investments, and decrease social welfare (Davis 2005). In addition, studies examining the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the economic sanctions are rare. The other 
contribution is that I have extended the data in my research due to the fact that the economic 
sanctions imposed on Iran are changing overtime and has been continued for quite a long period 
of time. 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007) determined that the long-run and short-run impact of 
sanctions are different on both foreign and domestic investment, this is because of a rise in the 
rate of return to investment after sanctions imposed. However, eventually there will be more 
production costs and less profits and in the long run the target economy adjusts to a new 
equilibrium. 
 Mostly the sanctions have been tightened. However, there have been some periods when 
sanctions were relaxed. These changes can have different effects on the macroeconomy. In 
addition, the longer the period of sanctions the more the targeted country can find different 
ways to adjust, so extended data helps to get a better conclusion about the impact of sanctions 
and whether they are efficient or not.  Although the imposed sanctions are mostly from the US, 
the countries imposing sanctions have changed over time. This is important because the trade 
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relations between countries affect the macroeconomy and exports and imports. In the long run 
we have more flexibility and more adjustability with a longer database. 
3.5.1- Data: 
In this analysis I use seven macroeconomic variables. My data set contains quarterly 
observations on Iran from 1991Q3 to 2011Q1 (Appendix A) which is the time period that all 
the variables data were available. 
The variables included are real GDP growth, the inflation, the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) from the IMF, ratio of imports to GDP, oil exports (volume) and the Budget Deficit. 
The other variable used are oil prices which are in US dollars. All variables are in natural 
logarithms and I am using seasonally adjusted data as obtained from the different sources. A 
mixture of financial and fundamental macroeconomic variables shows a bigger picture of 
effects on the different factors on the economy. The most important macroeconomy variables 
are shown in graphs in the second chapter. Moreover, import and budget deficit to GDP ratio 
is presented in figures below. Iran import reached a peak in 2011 and its lowest amount has 
been in 1989. The ratio of Budget deficit to GDP has been around 5 percent over the several 
past years and it is believed that budget deficits is significantly due to large amount of 





Figure 3.4: import 
 
source: personal collection 
Figure 3.5: Budget deficit in percentage of GDP 
 














































































Real gross domestic product is extracted from the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) online database, 
quarterly observations are available from 1988Q2. The real effective exchange rate based on 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the 
1979 revolution the Iranian Rial has depreciated significantly against the US Dollar under a 
variety of exchange rate regimes from a fixed rate to multiple rates and back to a unified pegged 
managed rate. It has depreciated from 70 Rials per US Dollar in 1979 to 9170 Rials per US 
dollar in 2006. 
As is shown in the previous Figures for the free rate or black-market rate and the official 
exchange rate over the period 1980Q2 to 2014Q1, which are both reported by the Central Bank 
of Iran, the two rates are at a par at the start of the revolution but depart soon thereafter. In this 
chapter we are using the official real effective exchange rate which is extracted from the IMF 
database and it is a good factor to look at the general performance of the exchange rate. They 
have however been brought into line which can be associated with the successful unification 
of the exchange rate in 2002. In 2002 the government unified the official exchange to a new 
rate very close to the black-market exchange rate. The main reason to unify the official 
exchange rates is to reduce the black-market premium, rent-seeking activities and social 
corruption, and also to decrease the administrative cost of the multiple exchange rate system, 
so as to have market determined exchange rates and also to assist non-oil exports.  
I obtained the Consumer Price Index and import data from the CBI online database which are 
available from 1990Q2. Quarterly oil exports (thousand barrels per day) are available 1978Q2 
from the CBI. The oil price data is the quarterly average of the monthly data from the IMF 
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which is the simple average of three spot prices; Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and 
the Dubai Fateh. 
3.5.2- Methodology: 
I have used an unrestricted vector autoregression model (VAR) to investigate the response of 
macroeconomic variables to innovations. The VAR model provides a multivariate framework 
where changes in a particular variable are related to changes in its own lags and to changes in 
other variables and their lags. The VAR treats all variables as jointly endogenous and does not 
impose a prior restriction on the structural relationships. Once the VAR has been estimated the 
relative importance of an individual market in generating variations in its own value and in the 
value of other markets can be assessed by variance decomposition. The dynamic response of 
the macroeconomic variables to innovations in a particular variable or market can also be 
obtained from the Impulse Response Function (IRF). The IRF allows us to examine the 
dynamic effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian macroeconomic variables. 
The unrestricted vector autoregressive model is presented as: 
B1 = C + ∑ E0B1%0
F
0G& + H1   (3.1) 
Where c is the intercept vector of the VAR, E0 is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients (K 
x K) and H1 is the white noise process. B1 is vector of K observed variables 
I have used the real exchange rate, real output growth, inflation and oil export and oil prices 
following Pesaran (2009). In addition, imports are used in the study by Farzanegan (2007) 
which analysed the oil price shocks. I have included the budget deficit to see how it is affected 
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and also it shows the ability of the government to finance its spending while sanctions are 
imposed. 
According to the monetarist view, budget deficits can lead to inflation (Hamburger and Zwick 
(1981)). In the monetarist models, changes in the inflation rate closely depend on changes in 
the money supply. Generally, the budget deficit does not cause inflationary pressures, but rather 
affects the price level through the impact on money aggregates and public expectations, which 
causes movements in prices. 
It is important for policy makers to know the direction of causality between the variables so 
that they can decide on the most relevant policies. In addition, most of the studies on the Iranian 
economy do not examine structural breaks. Investigating the relationship between oil exports 
and economic growth is important for economic welfare. Many empirical studies on different 
countries have indicated the relationship between oil exports and economic growth by using 
the Granger causality test. Some of them determined the causality between exports and growth 
(Thornton 1996), and some others believe that there is no Granger causality between them 
(Bahmani-Oskooee 1993).  
Assuming the exchange rate does not Granger cause the oil exports, shows that exchange rate 
movements do not affect the exports. Assuming oil exports Granger cause GDP, indicates that 
the country is vulnerable to external shocks, specifically a reduction in oil exports. As expected 
form the previous literatures, the results determined that oil exports Granger caused the real 
exchange rate and the exchange rate caused GDP. This indicates that the real exchange rate is 
an important factor in increasing the economic growth of Iran. In addition, if the oil exports do 
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not Granger cause inflation, this could be because of Islamic banking and lack of an interest 
rate. 
As a first step I have checked the time series properties of the variables in order to determine 
the appropriate specification for the VAR estimation. The variables are first differenced. The 
order of integration for each variable is determined using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) 
test. The results of this test are reported in table 5. This test indicates that the variables 
expressed in logs are non-stationary. When all variables are first differenced we find evidence 
that all variables are stationary. So the variables of the model follow I (1) processes (Appendix 
C). And the optimal lag length is 4. The selected lag length is based on same criteria which are 
shown in table 1. The first differenced variables indicate the percentage change or the growth 
of the variable, as an example, the first differenced (logged) GDP determines  economic 
growth, the first differenced Deficit can be interpreted as the growth in the deficit and 
government debt percentage.  Import changes indicate an outflow of funds from the country. 
CPI changes are defined as inflation. And changes in the exchange rate determine the 
appreciation or depreciation of the currency. 
3.5.2.1- Order selection: 
To determine the lag order in the VAR model I use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
AIC selects the lag order 4 whilst SBC selects the lag order 1. According to different criteria 
and autocorrelation test, the optimal lag length is 4.  
Unit root test 
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To make a sensible interpretation of the long run relationships and to make sure that we do not 
work with a mixture of I (1) and I (2) variables, the unit root properties should be considered. 
For this purpose, the standard Dickey-Fuller test is used. 
Stationarity test: 
Table 2.11 reports the Dickey-Fuller test for the stationarity of each variable. The test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. After first differencing each series it rejects the null 
hypothesis of nonstationary. According to the Dickey-Fuller test all variables have a unit root 
in levels and are stationary after first differencing. I chose the model with a trend. 
Table 3.1: Dickey-Fuller test 
variables level First difference 
CPI -2.74 -3.86 
Exchange rate -2.42 -8.91 
GDP -3.29 -8.11 
Import -1.41 -12.68 
Oil export -0.76 -7.56 
Oil price -1.18 -4.80 




3.5.2.2- Granger Causality Tests: 
According to Granger causality, if X1 Granger causes X2, then past values of X1 should contain 
information that helps predict X2 above and beyond the information contained in past values 
of X2 alone. Its mathematical formulation is based on linear regression modelling of stochastic 
processes (Granger 1969).  
Considering a bivariate linear autoregressive model of two variables X1and X2: 
<&(t) =∑ E&&,J<&
F
JG&  (t−j) +∑ E&7,J<7
F
JG&  (t−j) +E1 (t)   (3.2) 
<7 (t) =∑ E7&,J<&
F
JG&  (t−j) +∑ E77,J<7
F
JG&  (t−j) +E2 (t)   (3.3) 
Where p is the maximum number of lagged observations, the matrix A contains the coefficients 
of the model, and E1 and E2 are residuals. 
If the variance of E1 (or E2) is reduced by the inclusion of the X2 (or X1) in the first (or second) 
equation, then it is said that X2 (or X1) Granger causes X1(or X2) (Pesaran et al. 2012). In other 
words, X2 causes X1 if the coefficients in E&7are jointly significantly different from zero, 
which can be tested by an F-test of the null hypothesis that E&7 = 0. 
As we can see from the Granger causality test results, we have evidence of Granger causality 
from GDP and oil exports to the exchange rate, but not vice versa. Moreover, GDP and the 
exchange rate Granger cause imports (Table 3.3). Oil exports only appear to Granger cause the 
exchange rate, suggesting that sanctions have had little effect on the Iranian economy, with the 
exchange rate acting as a form of buffer. 
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Table 3.3: VAR Granger Causality 
 Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 Dependent variable 
Inflation DEFICIT Exchange rate GDP IMPORT OIL EXPORT 
Inflation  0.83 0.28 0.95 0.37 0.29 
DEFICIT 0.82  0.98 0.69 0.77 0.64 
EXCHANGE RATE 0.55 0.92  0.11 0.03 0.09 
GDP 0.55 0.96 0.04  0.00 0.06 
IMPORT 0.75 0.95 0.53 0.19  0.15 
OIL EXPORT 0.92 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.12  
All 0.94 0.99 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.18 
 
 
Table 3.4: autocorrelation results 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation 
LM Tests 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1 47.40 0.09 
2 30.08 0.74 
3 38.74 0.34 
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4 33.87 0.57 
      
VAR Model and Toda and Yamamoto (1998) approach: 
In this section the VAR model in levels and the Toda Yamamoto (1998) causality test is 
estimated. I am testing the long run causal relationship between the variables based on the 
Granger causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
indicated that the power of unit roots and cointegration tests are low in comparison with the 
hypothesis of stationarity. The variables are integrated of order 1 according to the unit root test 
and The VAR model in levels is estimated with the lag length of 1. This approach provides 
testing for causality between integrated variables (Mehrara 2007). The Toda Yamamoto (1998) 
model is as follow: 














My dependent and independent variables are the vector of n by 1. d is the maximum order of 
integration of the variables. k is the optimal lag order. The error term is white noise with zero 
mean. X does not granger cause Y if NL0 = 0 and Y does not granger cause X if ∅R0 = 0. I am 
focusing testing on the GDP, Exchange Rate and Oil Exports according to the previous results, 
due to the importance of these factors on Iran’s Economy and also imposed sanctions. 




Hypothesis Test statistics P-value 
GDP does not Granger cause the Exchange Rate 7.44 0.01 
Exchange Rate does not Granger cause GDP 9.85 0.00 
Exchange Rate does not Granger cause Oil Exports 1.87 0.42 
Oil Export does not Granger cause the Exchange Rate 7.66 0.00 
3.6- Impulse response functions: 
Impulse response functions determine the behaviour of the variable in reaction to a shock in a 
period of time. So, the generalized impulse response function is being used, to avoid the 
problem of ordering of the variables. 
Considering equation (3.2) as E(T)B1 = H1   (3.6) 
 where L is the lag and define as UB1 = B1%&   (3.7) 
and E(U) = VO − E&U − ⋯− EXUX is a matrix polynomial    (3.8) 
in this framework the impulse response function sets one factor of H1 to one and all other factors 
to zero and determines the response of B1 to this impulse. 
The middle line in the figures represents the impulse response function while the bands are for 
the confidence intervals. In this regard, when the horizontal line falls into the confidence 
interval, then the null hypothesis that there is no effect on the macroeconomic variables, i.e. 
they are not significantly different to zero, cannot be rejected. 
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The ordering of variables are according Farzanegan (2007) and budget deficit is added before 
inflation due to being more exogenous and affecting the inflation and is as follows: oil export, 
GDP, budget deficit, inflation, exchange rate and import. 
Figure 3.6 Shows the Impulse response functions based on the one standard deviation shock to 
changes in the macroeconomic variables. The response of the exchange rate to oil export shocks 
are positive and significant in the first 3 periods and after that duration the response is negative 
and not significantly different from zero. However, it is significantly negative and reaches its 
minimum in just one period. It goes back to its initial level at the end of the period. This could 
be a sign of Dutch disease in the short run, which shows the reduction of competitiveness in 
the tradeable sector of the economy. Although, an insignificant exchange rate is against the 
expectations of the Dutch Disease theory. Moreover, a significant depreciation in the Iranian 
exchange rate is in contrast to the Dutch disease. In addition, according to the literature the 
wrong economic policies are the reasons for the appearance of symptoms of the Dutch disease 
during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Also, an increase in the exchange rate is accompanied 
with an increase in output which is in contrast with the resource curse viewpoint. 
Responses of the CPI to oil export shocks are insignificant which indicates that oil export 
shocks do not have a significant effect on long run inflation. The sanctions on oil exports do 
not have a significant effect on the government budget. The effect of the oil exports on the 
imports is also insignificant, but significantly positive in period 5. 
Responses of the deficit, imports and GDP to changes in CPI are also insignificant. Looking at 
the exchange rate response to a CPI shock shows an insignificant effect with a one period 
positively significant effect in the fifth period. The CPI affects oil exports significantly and 
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positively in the third period and is insignificant for the rest of the periods. Also, other variables 
insignificantly respond to the deficit. Imports and deficit also have an insignificant effect on 
the other factors. 
The response of CPI is insignificant to both GDP and exchange rate shocks. Although the 
exchange rate and GDP responses to each other are significant in a period. The response of oil 
exports to GDP is positive initially and goes back to its initial level in the long run. There are 
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3.7-  Variance decomposition: 
The impulse response functions demonstrate the qualitative response of the variables to 
shocks (Farzanegan and Markwardt (2007)). Impulse response functions can show the 
interaction between variables and their responses to economic shocks. Variance 
decomposition shows how many unforeseen changes or variations of the variables in the 
model are explained by different shocks. Variance decomposition assess shocks behaviour 
and determine the importance of shocks to describe the variables fluctuations. 
Table 3.6 illustrates the variance decomposition of the VAR model. Cholesky Ordering: 
OILEXPORT, GDP, DEFICIT, CPI, EXCHANGERATE, IMPORT. The ordering is chosen 
according to the study by Farzanegan (2007) about oil price shocks and I decided to include 
the budget deficit before the consumer price index. Because it is assumed to be more exogenous 
than the consumer price index and the shock in the budget deficit would affect inflation. Surge 
Fishcer et al.,2002nt and Wallace (1981), Fishcer et al. (2002) and Edwards and Tabellini 
(1991) concluded that budget deficit has effect on inflation and there is significant correlation 
in high inflation countries. 
GDP accounts for only 8 % of the variance of the of oil exports after 2.5 years. Oil exports 
account for 3 percent of the variance in the deficit in the long run and is a more important 
variable than other factors, although very small, suggesting that it has very little effect on the 
deficit. The oil export change explains about 10 percent of the variance in the real effective 
exchange rate in the first period, increasing to 25 percent at the end of the period. This may be 
some evidence of the detrimental role of oil exports on changes in the real effective exchange 
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rate in the Iranian economy. For the exchange rate, the oil exports have the largest effects, 
especially in long run over two years. 
Despite the 14 percent share of oil export on the variation of GDP at first, this share remains 
insignificant until the end of the period at about 18 percent. Oil exports have the largest effect 
on the GDP. For the consumer price index, oil exports initially account for 0.45% and increase 
to 1.09 % change. The deficit has the largest effect on the consumer price index of about 14 
percent. All other variables have marginal shares.  
The oil exports increase their share or the variance from 0.25 percent to 5 percent on imports. 
The exchange rate effects import more than other variables in the long run. Also, the share of 
CPI increases from 1 to 13 % on the imports. The deficit accounts for almost 2 percent of 
changes in imports in all the periods and is marginal. Overall these results support those of the 
Impulse response functions in that oil exports have had little effect on the real economy, 
implying that the sanctions have not had too adverse effect on the economy overall. Although, 
oil exports granger cause exchange rate and exchange rate granger cause imports. 
Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition 
Variance Decomposition of Oil Export: 
        Period S.E. Inflation Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
4 0.02 7.55 1.89 3.00 7.47 2.05 78.01 
10 0.02 7.79 1.71 6.35 8.10 4.19 71.83 
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Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
Period S.E. Inflation Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 85.89 0.00 14.10 
4 8.69 1.42 3.06 2.85 73.80 2.91 15.92 
10 5.15 2.78 4.45 7.03 63.19 3.71 18.81 
        
         
Variance Decomposition of Deficit: 
Period S.E. Inflation  Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 0.14 0.00 97.48 0.00 0.23 0.00 2.27 
4 0.16 0.45 96.16 1.47 0.20 0.04 1.65 
10 0.18 1.49 90.85 2.96 0.55 0.78 3.33 
        
         
Variance Decomposition of Inflation: 
Period S.E. Inflation Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 0.03 90.06 9.37 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.45 
4 0.03 82.76 14.10 0.66 0.37 1.63 0.46 
10 0.04 76.88 14.48 3.23 1.76 2.53 1.09 
        




Variance Decomposition of Exchange rate: 
Period S.E. Inflation Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 0.15 0.72 1.98 80.06 6.49 0.00 10.72 
4 0.24 2.33 2.31 61.79 7.09 1.63 24.82 
10 0.31 7.98 2.69 52.08 8.91 2.49 25.81 
        
         
Variance Decomposition of Import: 
Period S.E. Inflation Deficit Exchange rate GDP Import Oil Export 
        
        1 0.08 1.99 1.14 0.58 0.60 95.42 0.25 
4 0.09 3.74 2.25 2.77 6.55 78.65 6.01 
10 0.10 13.36 2.79 13.74 11.24 53.99 4.86 
        
        
 
3.8-  The asymmetric effect: 
In this section the question is whether the relationship between oil export shocks and the 
macroeconomic variables is asymmetric. There are several studies addressing the relationship 
between the oil price shocks and the macroeconomy, such as Hamilton (1983) who studied the 
US economy. Mork (1989) presented an asymmetric definition of oil prices by separating 
positive and negative oil price changes. This approach is particularly relevant for analysing 
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sanctions, as it allows us to differentiate between the sanction induced negative shocks and the 
positive shocks. If the negative shocks have more effect on the macroeconomy than the positive 
shocks, then this suggests it is the sanctions that are producing that effect. 
One of the characteristics of oil shocks to oil revenues is that they are asymmetrical. In general, 
it is assumed that negative oil shocks reduce domestic production and raise inflation (Mehrara 
2008). Increasing oil revenues, increases the inflation level without increasing production. 
Increases in oil revenues tends to raise government spending. Particularly in Iran’s economy, 
government spending, crowds out the private investors and causes a reduction in the positive 
effects of government spending (Kazemi et al. 2013). Moreover, when there is a reduction in 
oil prices, reductions in government spending do not correspond to the oil revenue reduction 
due to the flexibility in government spending. In this situation, there is economic inefficiency, 
accordingly, there is an asymmetric effect from oil shocks in Iran's economy. 
In this study, Mork’s (1989) definition of oil price shocks is used.  I apply the same method to 
measure oil export shocks which distinguishes between positive and negative oil export 
changes as follows: 
Posoil =max (0, ∆ lnoilY1)       (3.9) 
Negoil =min (0, ∆ lnoilY1)       (3.10) 
 Lnoilr is the natural logarithm of oil exports (thousand barrels). 
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3.8.1- Order selection: 
To determine the lag order I use the following Criterion. The results are summarized in table 
3.7 and 3.8. For the negative shocks, AIC selects the lag order 3 for negative variables. 
However, according to different criteria and autocorrelation test, the optimal lag length is 4.  
Table 3.7: Lag ordering for negative shocks 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -430.54 NA   0.00  11.20   11.56*  11.34 
1 -352.35  140.55  0.00  10.13  11.57   10.71* 
2 -318.95  54.96  0.00  10.20  12.72  11.21 
3 -261.32   86.071*   0.00*   9.65*  13.25  11.09 
4 -226.97  46.09  0.00  9.69  14.37  11.57 
       
       
For the positive shocks AIC, I choose lag order of 4, as it is shown in table 5. According to the 
AIC and the autocorrelation test I choose the optimal lag of 4. 
Table 3.8: Lag Ordering for 
positive shocks     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -430.26 NA   0.00  11.19  11.55  11.34 
1 -351.30  141.94  0.00  10.10   11.54*   10.68* 
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2 -317.40  55.77  0.00  10.162  12.68  11.17 
3 -269.86  71.00  0.00  9.87  13.46  11.31 
4 -225.04   60.13*   0.00*   9.64*  14.32  11.52 
       
       
 
3.8.2- Impulse response function: 
Below is the graph of the impulse response functions based on a one standard deviation shock 
to negative changes in oil exports (Figure 3.7). The response of the GDP is fluctuating. The 
consumer price index response to innovations in negative oil exports is insignificant. Also, the 
response of the import and deficit to shocks on negative changes in oil exports is insignificant 
and fluctuating. 
An oil export decrease initially increases the real effective exchange rate significantly until 
seven periods and reaches its maximum after 4 periods, but with a decreasing trend we observe 
a negative response.  
Considering the response of variables to positive changes in oil exports, in comparison to the 
negative changes, the main difference can be seen in the response of the real effective exchange 
rate. The real effective exchange rate responds positively initially but there is a significant 
negative response from period three and it goes back to its initial level at the end of the period. 
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3.8.3- Variance decomposition: 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present the variance decomposition of the VAR model.  For the consumer 
price index, the negative oil price shock is 2 percent in the long run and has an increasing trend. 
However positive oil price shocks account for a little less than the negative shocks. Negative 
oil export shocks have a larger impact in the long run in comparison with the positive shocks. 
The negative changes have explained 37 percent in the long run. Which can show the 
detrimental role of negative shocks on changes in the real effective exchange rate in the Iranian 
economy. Positive oil price shocks have a 28 percent effect on the real effective exchange rate 
in the long run. Negative oil export shocks have a marginal effect on the GDP and account for 
around 7 percent. While positive oil export shocks have a larger effect, which is 3% initially 
and increases to 15 percent in the long run. The effect of oil export changes are marginal on 
the deficit. However, the negative shocks have more of an effect than positive shocks. The 
deficit plays an important role on the consumer price index and accounts for about 15 percent 
in the long run. Negative oil export changes have significant effects on the exchange rate. Both 
negative and positive shock s have marginal effect on imports. While GDP effects import by 
15% in long run. 
Table 3.9: variance decomposition for negative shocks 
         Variance Decomposition of Negative Oil Export: 
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 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.05  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.06  86.63  4.67  1.28  4.12  1.33  1.95 
 10  0.06  79.21  5.52  2.04  6.57  2.34  4.29 
        
         Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.03  8.01  91.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.03  6.70  82.39  3.50  1.59  2.57  3.22 
 10  0.04  7.01  69.71  5.98  2.75  9.41  5.11 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Deficit: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  57.39  1.71  0.48  97.80  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  68.21  2.79  0.43  94.58  0.42  1.59  0.15 
 10  48.53  4.61  0.71  88.92  1.91  3.32  0.49 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Inflation: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.02  0.12  0.00  9.56  90.30  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.02  0.14  0.68  14.87  81.98  0.67  1.63 
 10  0.02  1.97  1.58  15.06  75.75  2.65  2.96 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Exchange rate: 
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 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit CPI Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.11  0.29  7.95  2.11  0.53  89.10  0.00 
 4  0.17  43.72  5.00  2.60  2.74  44.64  1.26 
 10  0.18  36.69  10.61  4.74  6.90  38.66  2.37 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Import: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.16  0.46  0.02  1.60  1.75  5.29  90.85 
 4  0.25  3.15  8.59  2.91  4.45  5.55  75.33 
 10  0.31  4.46  11.30  3.74  14.05  15.39  51.02 
        
                
 
Table 3.10: Variance Decomposition for positive shocks 
 Variance Decomposition of Positive Oil Export: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.05  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.06  81.78  10.36  0.84  3.83  1.97  1.19 
 10  0.06  75.27  11.55  1.162  5.14  5.18  1.67 
        
         Variance Decomposition of GDP: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.03  3.57  96.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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 4  0.03  9.26  81.43  3.79  1.22  1.62  2.65 
 10  0.04  15.49  69.22  4.98  1.95  5.06  3.28 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Deficit: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  31.92  0.17  0.99  98.82  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 4  81.74  0.61  0.64  95.97  0.37  2.33  0.05 
 10  94.54  1.15  1.04  91.73  1.36  3.76  0.92 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Inflation: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.02  0.93  0.11  10.26  88.68  0.00  0.00 
 4  0.02  1.10  0.49  15.13  80.56  0.78  1.91 
 10  0.02  1.45  2.60  14.92  76.26  1.42  3.32 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Exchange rate: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.13  4.90  9.40  0.46  0.09  85.12  0.00 
 4  0.15  19.54  12.64  0.54  1.62  64.75  0.88 
 10  0.18  28.10  13.59  1.25  7.91  47.27  1.84 
        
         Variance Decomposition of Import: 
 Period S.E. Oil Export GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
        
         1  0.16  0.25  1.32  1.49  1.19  1.55  94.17 
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 4  0.24  4.35  8.91  2.49  3.09  2.93  78.20 
 10  0.31  4.08  14.64  3.10  14.64  10.19  53.32 
        
         Cholesky Ordering: Positive oil export, GDP, Deficit, Inflation, Exchange rate, Import 
                
 
3.8.4- Granger Causality Tests: 
Table 3.11: 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Positive oil 
export 
GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
Positive oil export  0.44 0.89 0.89 0.00** 0.17 
GDP 0.11  0.93 0.52 0.03** 0.00** 
Deficit 0.89 0.61  0.85 0.99 0.82 
Inflation 0.50 0.95 0.81  0.36 0.36 
Exchange rate 0.13 0.16 0.77 0.55  0.06 
Import 0.38 0.29 0.92 0.76 0.81  
Notes: P-values in parentheses. **  indicates significance at the 5% level. 
As we can see there is Granger causality from positive and negative oil prices to the exchange 
rate and also from GDP to the exchange rate. We can say that the exchange rate Granger causes 
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imports as well.  The exchange rate causes GDP while we have negative shocks. Also, GDP 
cause imports in negative shock situations. 
Table 3.12: 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Negative 
Oil Export 
GDP Deficit Inflation Exchange rate Import 
Negative oil export  0.80 0.99 0.95 0.00** 0.61 
GDP 0.49  0.98 0.57 0.08* 0.00** 
Deficit 0.92 0.59  0.89 0.65 0.78 
Inflation 0.27 0.92 0.87  0.20 0.36 
Exchange rate 0.69 0.03 0.91 0.64  0.07* 
Import 0.20 0.21 0.94 0.63 0.70  
Notes: P-values in parentheses. ** (*) indicates significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
3.9-  Conclusion: 
In this chapter vector autoregression model is used to investigate the dynamic behaviour of the 
economy. The most important macroeconomic variables are used such as real effective 
exchange rate, GDP, inflation, oil export and oil prices, import and deficit. Impulse response 
function and variance decomposition are used to determine the reaction of the variables to the 
shocks and asses shocks behaviour. The results show that the oil export shocks have significant 
effect on the exchange rate. moreover, exchange rate and GDP have significant effect on each 
other. Also, variance decomposition approach determine that Oil export has the largest effect 
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on the exchange rate which conforms to Farzanegan et al (2009) results and the least effect on 
the deficit. In addition, the asymmetric effects are studied and it is determined that negative oil 
price shocks have more effect on macroeconomic variables particularly on the real effective 
exchange rate rather than the positive oil shocks. This is similar to the Farzanegan et al (2009) 
and Emami et al (2012) studies and is in contrast with the results from the developed countries 
in comparison with developing countries such as Hamilton (2003).  Whilst most of the studies 
have considered oil prices when studying Iran’s macroeconomy, I have used the oil export as 
an important factor in the macroeconomy and the imposed sanctions. Moreover, In the Jbir and 
Zouari- Ghorbel (2009) study about Tunisia, the were no effects of oil price shocks on the 
economy directly. The results help to indicate which variables have significant effects on the 
others and considering the focus of imposed sanctions on the oil sector, it is shown that mostly 
the exchange rate is affected so the sanctions focusing on the oil sector do not change the other 
factor of the economy significantly and so are not successful. In addition, we can investigate 





Appendix A: conversion from Iranian to Gregorian Years 
The Iranian year generally starts on the 21st of March, as such the Iranian quarter 1 contains 10 
days of the Gregorian calendar quarter 1 and 80 days of Gregorian quarter 2.  
Appendix C: Asymmetric effects 
Table 3.13: Autocorrelation test (positive shocks) 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation 
LM Tests 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  43.68018  0.1775 
2  26.96519  0.8620 
3  38.25588  0.3674 
4  42.04810  0.2254 
 
Table 3.14: Autocorrelation (negative shocks) 
VAR Residual Serial Correlation 
LM Tests 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1  34.75611  0.5277 
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2  43.59669  0.1797 
3  46.74333  0.1084 














Chapter 4: Sanctions and the Macroeconomy: A Markov Switching 
Approach: 
 
4.1- Introduction:  
In this chapter I will analyse the effects of the economic sanctions applied to Iran on the wider 
macroeconomy using a regime switching approach. The goal of sanctions analysis is to 
determine if the sanctions have had any effect on the economy and how the target country 
responded to the imposed sanctions. Economic sanctions in Iran have been imposed in the form 
of economic restrictions and trade barriers. 
The aim of economic sanctions is to put pressure on the target economy and apply economic 
restrictions on the target country to achieve specific political changes. By applying different 
policies like the supply of more public goods the target country’s government tries to reduce 
the negative effects of sanctions. The government response and reaction of the macroeconomy 
in general to sanctions can make sanctions ineffective. In this chapter I apply the Markov 
switching model to analyse Iran’s economic regime changes in response to imposed economic 
sanctions. Markov switching models are common models which present time variation in the 
parameters through different regimes and the current regime value depends on the previous 
period. The economic variables may have structural breaks due to different political, financial 
and economic arrangements and Markov switching model is capable of determining the 
behaviour pattern of the data during specific periods of time and this is why the Markov 
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switching model is chosen to analyse the sanctions and macroeconomy variables in Iran. 
Moreover, this model can determine several temporary changes.  
There has been some research which has focused on the effects of sanctions and other studies 
that have focused on the oil price shocks and GDP relationship using the Markov switching 
model, these studies include Mehmet Balcilar et.al. (2015). Balcilar et al. (2015) analysed the 
effect of oil price shocks on the S&P 500 index by applying a two regime Markov-switching 
model, in a VECM setting with a low and high volatility regime. They used monthly data from 
1859 to 2013. They defined a two variable model and the results indicate that high volatility 
regimes are more prevailing before the Great Depression and after 1973. They determine that 
the MS approach is one of the most appealing methods to tackle structural breaks and a good 
fit for time series which experience shocks and regime shifts. Imposed sanctions have mostly 
targeted oil exports and the Central Bank in order to reduce Iran’s oil revenue and weaken the 
currency. 
The economy of Iran is highly dependent on oil exports, it is the basis of wealth creation and 
economic growth. Over the past years, the international community, mostly the United States 
of America, the European Union and the United Nations have imposed several economic 
sanctions on Iran due to its contentious nuclear program among other international political 
issues. The economic sanctions are intended to compel Iran to suspend its nuclear programs. 
This chapter investigates the effects of sanctions on Iran’s macroeconomy, which are mainly 
due to Iran’s nuclear program, as well as their effectiveness in achieving the set objectives. The 
data is collected from the Central Bank of Iran which includes seven macroeconomic variables 
namely the exchange rate, GDP, trade deficit, CPI, imports, oil export, and oil price for the 
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period between 1990 and 2017, at the moment the data are available until 2017. The Markov 
Switching Model is employed to study the effects of economic sanctions. 
4.1.1- Introduction to Iran: 
Macroeconomic variables are liable to shocks which are the cause of breaks in the time series. 
Economic sanctions are used to make targeted changes in a targeted country by restricting the 
economic activities and performance, which is likely to cause such a break. Diebold et al (1994) 
extended Hamilton’s (1989) Markov Switching model and assumed that the regime switching 
probability depends on economic fundamentals. They allowed time varying transition 
probabilities by using observable covariates. In the extended model exogenous explanatory 
variables and dependent variables’ lagged values are included. This approach is more flexible 
than fixed transition probabilities, however, choosing variables or functional specifications is 
not always clear.  
Analysis about Iran’s macroeconomy and the sanctions that the country has faced are limited 
and rare, so this study will contribute to the literature on sanctions and breaks. However, it may 
be the case that the switching doesn’t pick up much change, as Naghavi et al (2015) believed 
that economic sanctions imposed on Iran during different years, has led to the country’s 
stabilization rather than fulfilling the aim of the sanctions.  
As explained by Zarouni (2016), the Iranian oil industry has become the basis of wealth 
creation in the modern society. It plays a crucial role in helping the country achieve its target 
growth and development plans. Over the past decades, Iran’s policymakers have come up with 
lots of essential economic development plans. Despite this, the country has also been recently 
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subjected to various economic sanctions, which are largely considered to be obstacles in 
achieving its development plans and goals (Zarouni (2016)). 
Over the past decades, Iran has been subjected to a number of economic sanctions, which are 
used as tools to weaken the country’s economic power. According to Petrescu (2008), most 
economists and politicians believe that sanctions would lead to the affected country undergoing 
a change of political and economic behaviour. In the recent past, the United Nations (UN) and 
the United States of America (USA) have been increasingly using economic sanctions in order 
to achieve specific foreign policy objectives (Zarouni 2016). They impose the sanctions either 
unilaterally or through the United Nations Security Council. 
According to Petrescu (2008), economic development is the most important policy from Iran’s 
perspective. Iran Perspective Document 1404 expresses the above interest in the first two 
paragraphs. The first paragraph identifies, “health, welfare, food security, social security, equal 
opportunities, income distribution, strong families away from poverty, corruption, 
discrimination, and benefit from a favourable environment” as the key development concerns 
(Farzanegan 2013). Iran needs economic development in order to achieve the above 
components and sanctions are an obstacle to the country’s ability to achieve the above 
components of economic growth. 
In theory, economic sanctions lead to internal inefficiencies resulting in slow economic growth 
and development. According to Zarouni (2016), sanctions affect large parts of Iran’s economy 
in six main ways which are decreasing investment, limiting access to foreign exchange and 
finance, rising inflation and unemployment, and slowing economic growth. 
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The current empirical study analyses the impact of past economic sanctions on Iran’s 
macroeconomy. The primary goal of the empirical study is to determine whether the economic 
sanctions have affected the country’s macroeconomy or not through creating times when 
sanctions are having some effect and times when this is not the case, as well as the extent of 
their success in achieving the intended outcomes. The chapter also determines how Iran has 
responded to the imposed economic sanctions. The Markov switching model was applied to 
study this research phenomenon by analysing the effects of two regimes on the Iranian 
economy, the first regime being with no sanctions, the second including the sanctions. Political 
and economic decisions can make structural breaks for some economic variables overtime and 
MS approach models the behaviour pattern of the data during a time period and deals with 
structural breaks. Markov switching approach can estimate changes of dependent and 
independent variables simultaneously and moreover the permanent or temporary changes can 
be determined. 
Some literature strongly believe that recent economic sanctions imposed on Iran’s oil and 
financial sectors are taking a toll on its macroeconomy (Morin and Steven 2000). However, 
other literature believes that Iran’s macroeconomy is doing well because the country has 
initiated effective counteractive measures (Marinov 2005). Therefore, understanding how the 
economic sanctions are affecting Iran’s economy is an important concern to everyone including 
researchers, academicians, government policymakers, as well as investors and developers. 
Iran is facing numerous economic challenges, some of which have been accentuated by the 
past and current economic sanctions (Drury (1998)). According to Kaempfer and Anton (1992), 
the main challenges include high youth unemployment, high inflation rates, the depreciation of 
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the currency, and the abolition of subsidiaries as well as an economic downturn. The inflation 
rate is anticipated to worsen in the coming years mainly due to currency devaluation. It is not 
evident whether the economic sanctions imposed by the international communities on Iran are 
achieving their primary objectives. They could be useless if Iran is able to respond effectively 
and counteract the effects of the imposed sanctions. Just like other countries, Iran could have 
been able to shield itself from the effect of the economic sanctions imposed by the international 
community including the United Nations and the USA. Little information has been provided 
by the international community on the ability of Iran to shield itself from the worst effects of 
the economic sanctions. 
In addition to analysing the sanction’s effects, we will see how Iran has been responding to 
them. Also, the chapter determines whether the economic sanctions have been successfully 
achieving the intended outcome, which is essential in determining their continued use. 
The paper features five sections. The first presents the background. The next reviews the 
literature. The chapter discusses the methodology and Markov switching model. The fourth 
and fifth sections presents findings and conclusion respectively. 
Table 4.1: Multilateral Economic sanctions against Iran 
Years Principal Purpose 
2006 UN, USA To stop nuclear program 




2007 UN, USA, 
EU 
To prevent institutions/individual from making 
financial commitment to Iran 
2008 UN To stop collaboration with Iran’s credit and 
national banks 
 UN, USA To compel Iran to enforce provision of previous 
UN resolutions 
2010 UN Intensification of former resolutions and 
penalties 
 EU, UN A ban on joint venture between Iran and 
European countries 
2011 UN, EU To expand the scope of nuclear sanction 
 
4.2.1- Effects of the Economic Sanctions: 
As explained by Pape (1998) economic sanctions have caused difficulties in the oil-dominated 
Iranian economy. Oil exports have been gradually declining due to economic sanctions 
imposed by the USA, EU, and UN. 
Economic sanctions have severe social and economic effects (Drury, 1998). The country has 
reduced access to necessary materials and products for its energy and oil sector. As a result, a 
number of oil companies have withdrawn from Iran thereby causing a decline in oil production. 




The literature has also indicated that the economic sanctions have caused basic goods to 
become expensive for the public. Smuggling has also increased since it is the easiest way to 
get around the economic sanctions (Morin 2000)). However, smuggling is weakening the civil 
society in Iran. In addition, the inflation rate has also been increasing due to economic 
sanctions.  
4.2- Literature review of Markov Switching Model: 
The Markov switching model has been a common approach to studying the business cycle in 
different countries. This model was originally proposed by Hamilton (1989) and is one of the 
most important macroeconometrics models where there is regime changing present. It is a 
nonlinear approach to examining the asymmetric characteristics of a model, Hamilton (1989) 
introduced Markov switching models which allows different mean growth rates of a time series 
over unobserved states. Hamilton (1989) proposed two regime Markov switching models and 
examined the US output growth. 
The Markov switching model has been used widely for economic and financial analyses for 
instance Hamilton (1989), Goodwin (1993), Kim and Nelson (1998). Hamilton (1989) and 
Chauvet and Hamilton (2004) examined business cycles in the US applying the Markov 
switching model. while Raymond and Rich (1997), Holmes and Wang (2003) and Clements 
(2002) have used the Markov Switching approach to investigate the impacts of oil shocks on 
the UK and US business cycles. The Markov switching model is one of the most common 
models in literature for non-linear time series. The Markov switching model includes multiple 
equations to characterize the behaviour of time series in different regimes. By switching 
between regimes, the more complex dynamic patterns are determined (Kuan 2002). 
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Saltoglu et al (2003) examined Turkey’s business cycle using the Markov switching approach. 
Stanca (1999) used this approach to study Italy while Cologni and Manera (2009) focused on 
the developed countries business cycle, but applying the Markov switching model to oil 
exporting countries like Iran are rare. Several studies have been carried out with an aim of 
establishing the effect of oil prices on the economy of a particular country (Jiménez-Rodríguez, 
2015; Mohseni & Modallal, 2017).   
Raymond and Rich (1997) examined the nonlinear relationship between the macroeconomy 
and oil price shocks between1952 and 1995 and presented evidence of nonlinearity by using 
oil prices in a US output MS model and used real oil prices and real US GDP data. They 
investigated the relationship between oil price shocks and output fluctuations in the US by 
using the two regime Markov switching model of Hamilton (1989). They suggested oil price 
shocks play a role in output fluctuations and the oil price has strong impacts on the 
macroeconomy. Real oil price increases explain the switches in the mean growth rate of GDP. 
Also, the oil price explains the shift during the 1990-91 recession. On the other hand, the effects 
of oil price shocks on GDP growth cannot define the extent of the shift in the output at the time 
of any low growth phases. My approach follows Raymond and Rich (1997). They also 
determine that oil price shocks mostly affect the mean of growth rather than transition 
probabilities. 
Raymond and Rich (1997), have used the maximum likelihood (ML) approach through the 
nonlinear filter algorithm from Hamilton (1998) to estimate the parameters of their model. 
Using the filter probability allow an interference for the unobserved regime in each period of 
time. The filter probabilities are important in forecasting the switches. The literature about the 
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relationship between the oil price and macroeconomy have paradoxical results. Raymond and 
Rich (1997) indicated that oil price shocks have significant effect on economic growth.  They 
used the two regimen Markov Switching Model of Hamilton (1989) for examining the oil price 
rises and USA output growth relationship and rejected the statistical coincidence between oil 
prices and output. The key insight of the Raymond and Rich (1997) study, which is important 
in my study is that the relationship between the oil sector and macroeconomy is complex and 
involves more than one regime. In the case of Iran one of the regimes is when sanctions are 
imposed. 
Kim and Loungani (1992) identify that the oil price shock contribution to the variance of output 
is moderate. The negative effect of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy have been reported 
by Hamilton (1983), Kilian (2008) and Mork (1994). Reboredo (2010). They analyse the 
nonlinearity in oil price shocks and the stock markets by using the Markov switching approach 
and reported the negative impact of oil on the stock market. They investigated Canada, 
Germany, UK and US. Basher et al. (2016) reported a nonlinear relationship between oil prices 
and the exchange rate by using the Markov switching model. Their results are the same for oil 
importing countries as well as the oil exporting countries. 
Much of the literature has focused on the oil and macroeconomic relationship. Most of the 
literature indicates a significant effect of oil prices on economic variables such as Cologni and 
Manera (2006) who studied the output growth and oil price by using the Markov switching 
model. They indicated a significant effect of oil price shocks causing recessions in G-7 
countries. Simon (1996) applied the Markov Switching model to examine inflation in Australia 
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and modelled the 1960s inflation by a two-regime specification and indicated the regime 
change in the 1970s and 1990s. 
Wiese (2016) also examined the relationship between oil price shocks and the stock market by 
using the Markov switching model for the US, UK, Canada, Germany Netherland and Japan.  
and found significant effects in high volatility regimes and a significant effect of the oil price 
on the stock market in general. 
Moreover, Morier and Teles (2016) showed that a rise in oil prices following an elongated 
period of stability resulted in pronounced macroeconomic consequences. Pinho and Madaleno 
(2016) used a two-regime multivariate Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive Model (MS-
VAR) to show the correlation between oil prices and stock returns. they showed that there 
exists a strong correlation between the oil prices and the general prices of items in a given 
sector.  
The results showed that the oil and gas sector have a significant effect on stock returns. It also 
showed that the response to oil price changes has more impact for high oil prices. This makes 
the oil and gas sector more sensitive to oil price changes compared to other sectors. Leonhardt, 
Ware, and Zagst (2017) used a co-integrated regime-switching model approach with jumps to 
predict the future prices of natural gas. The Markov-switching approach was used to predict 
the log-future prices based on seasonality and a regime-dependent factor process in a linear 
combination. The results showed different states of the underlying volatility in the future. The 
Markov chain switching approach can also be used to explain the dynamics of future growth 
based on past data (Morier & Teles, 2016).  
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Salehi (2015) applied the Markov switching ARMA model to investigate Iran’s business cycle 
and determinants of GDP from 1988Q1 to 2008Q2. They have considered nonlinearity and co-
movement for the Iranian economy and found that using MS is satisfactory. 
4.3- Methodology: 
The Markov switching model, which was introduced by Hamilton (1989) allows for time series 
data to account for periodic changes which occur through switches in various states. The 
Markov switching model is important due to the fact that it can allow changes in both the mean 
and variance and also allows for multiple breaks, so I have used the Markov switching model 
to analyse the effects of sanctions on the macroeconomy, as sanctions are a different state for 
the economy relative to normal conditions. The MS model allows for either permanent or many 
temporary changes to the data. The Markov switching model gives us better significance in the 
estimated parameters. The 2-state Markov switching is used to see the behaviour of the 
macroeconomic variables in 2 regimes which one regime is when sanctions exist and the other 
regime is without sanctions. 
The macroeconomic data has been collected from the Central Bank of Iran and the IMF. The 
Quarterly data were downloaded from the Central Bank of Iran’s website. The data covers the 
period between 1990 and 2017 during which time the country faced a number of economic 
sanctions imposed by the USA, EU, as well as the UN (see background chapter). 
The main variables considered in the dataset include the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
exchange rates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), imports and oil exports. The variables were 
selected because they provide a strong indicator of the country’s macroeconomy hence are able 
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to measure accurately the effect of economic sanctions. Oil exports are chosen as Iran 
economy’s dependency on oil and the sanctions targeting the oil sector. Moreover, these are 
the data that have been used in related literature such as Raymond and Rich (1997) and Pesaran 
(2012).  
4.4.1- The Markov Switching Model (MSM): 
Hamilton (1989) initially proposed the use of Markov switching models for characterizing 
fluctuations in economic series. The MSM is essentially the sum of the autoregressive and 
Markov processes. It allows the mean growth rate of the data to vary over time across different 
states. According to Raymond and Rich (1997), the model works with the assumption that 
periodic changes may be observed in the time series data such as switching between sanction 
and non-sanction regimes. Therefore, such changes are accounted for by switching states and 
allowing average durations and generating a process in which each state differs. 
The Markov switching approach is useful for modelling nonlinear time series where the data 
is assumed to have a different behaviour or structural breaks in different regimes. Dummy 
variables are used to estimate the model if the dates of the regime switches are known. For this 
study, the regime switches are expected to coincide with the dates when the economic sanctions 
were imposed. 
The research analyses the relationship between shocks due to economic sanctions and the 
fluctuations in the dependent variables. The question was explored by incorporating the 
variables into the Markov switching model and examining their capacity to generate shifts. In 
essence, the modelling strategy adopted for this research uses shifts between states in the 
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Markov framework to evaluate the effect of economic sanctions on variables representing the 
Iranian macroeconomic conditions. I will follow the approach used in Raymond and Rich 
(1997), which was conducted on the US business cycle and oil prices by using the Markov 
switching model. Since the impact of the oil sector is affected by the regime switching 
characteristics of the data. They investigated the impact of oil price fluctuations on the US 
economy and I am investigating the impact of the restrictions on the Iranian economy, 
specifically restrictions imposed on the oil sector using the Markov switching model. The 
imposed sanctions are acting as exogenous shocks to the economy. 
Model specification 
Consider a general autoregressive process of order p. Suppose K1	 and Z are the vector of 
variables and mean of the model respectively, then the first order M-state Markov switching 
model can be given by the equation below. 
K1 	− 	Z[1 	= 	∅1(K1%& 	− 	Z[1%&) 	+ ⋯+	\K1%F 	− 	Z[1%F] 	+	H1   (4.1) 
Where 
H1		~		_(0, `ab
7 )         (4.2) 




7 [c1,  ®  `ab
7 	= 	`&
7[&1 	+ 	`7
7[71   (4.4) 
d[[1 	= 	f|[1%& 	= 	h] 	= 	d0J	; 		h, f	 = 	1,2,3,…… ,>     (4.5) 
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[c1 	= 	1	if	[1 = q, and		[u1 	= 	0, otherwise     (4.6) 
 
M and d0J	 refers to the number of regimes (switches) and the transition probabilities of 
switching from one regime to another respectively. And [1 can have two values either 0 and 1.  
 The transition probabilities 
In practice, it is almost impossible to observe directly the prevailing regimes but presume its 
behaviour via the observed behaviour of variables (B1). The transition probabilities add up to 
one and follow a Markov process. They can be represented in matrix form. The transition 
probabilities are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. 
The Markov switching model is used for series that are considered to change over a set of 
states. The time and duration of switching between the states is random. For example, the 
process which generates changes in economic growth between its expansion and recession. 
 
4.4.2- Structural breaks: 
Economic variables may have structural breaks over time due to different factors like political, 
financial and economic decisions. The Markov switching model determines the behaviour of 
the data over time. The Markov switching model allows several changes over the short run or 
the long run. Switching models can determine the exact times of changes and breaks (Hashemi 
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et al. 2010). Also, the Markov switching model can estimate the transitions of dependent and 
independent variables at the same time (Mehregan et al. 2013).  
In the Markov switching model the probability of being in a specific regime depends on the 
previous period’s regime. Transformations between regimes are driven by fixed probabilities. 
In Markov switching models the timing of the breaks is endogenous which is different to other 
models with breaks. In fact, breaks are not imposed specifically but interventions are 
determined through probabilistic estimates of the most likely regime prevailing at each time 
(Simon 1996). Parameter estimations for the regimes are produced by maximum likelihood 
process.  
The probability for a specific state is identified by the ratio of the likelihood of that state and 
the total likelihood for both states. On occasions with specific data, the economic time series 
determines the breaks endogenously in their behaviour, corresponding with events such as 
financial crises (Hamilton, 2005).  
Considering a change in the behaviour of a variable yt. This can be shown as: 
yt = c}1 + φyt−1 + εt        (4.7) 
where st is a state variable and a random variable which is either 0 or 1 in a two regime model 
or (1, 2,…,N) in an N state model. The probability of }1 being equal to a value like j is: 
Pr (st = j|st−1 = i, st−2 = k,...,yt−1,yt−2,...) = Pr(st = j|st−1 = i) = pij  (4.8) 
Which in two regime model can be simplified as: 
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 dY(}1 = 0|}1%& = 0) = 	1 − dY(}1 = 1|}1%& = 1)	    (4.9) 
The transition probability 60J  represents the probability of transforming from state i at time t to 
state j at time t-1, the transition probability is an (N*N) matrix. The transition matrix in the two 
regime Markov model is: 
6 = ~
6&& 1 − 677
1 − 6&& 677
       (4.10) 
 
In Markov switching models, in addition to the independent variables and H1, B1 is function of 
}1 .  
We can determine a simple model to study the effect of sanctions on the economy by: 
B1 = C5(}1) + C&(}1)Ä1 + Å1(}1)H1      (4.11) 
H1 has zero mean and normal distribution H1~_(0, Å17) and C5, C& and Å1 have two values as the 
model switches between two regression models. 
K1 are endogenous variables and Ä1 are exogenous variables and in this study as an indicator of 
sanctions such as oil revenue shocks in this case. In other word, the Markov switching process 
is the functional form of the relationship between xt and Yt and the residual variance change 
over time.  
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According to the model, in order to study the effect of oil sanctions on the regime changes in 
other variables the following model is determined. As an example, if we study the GDP our 
model will be: 
ÇÉd1 = C5(}1) + C&(}1)ÑhTÖÄ6ÑY@1 + Å1(}1)H1    (4.11) 
Here K1 is vector of (n×1) of endogenous variables. 
 
4.4.3- Smoothed regime probabilities:  
In the Markov switching model, the time series data is assumed to occasionally follow a 
disrupted behaviour. The disruption is produced by shocks leading to different regimes, states, 
and dynamics governed by unobservable state variables. Filtered probabilities provide 
references about the [1 on the conditional information up to a certain time t. on the other hand, 
smoothed probabilities refer to the inferences about [1 regarding all information provided by 
the sample. We can evaluate structural breaks from the smoothed probability. The smoothed 
probability is from the estimated model and gives informative inference about the regime that 
the data lies in at the time. Smoothed probabilities are required for dating the structural breaks, 
which is considered to occur if  6&& > 0.5. In other words, there is a shift from one regime to 
another if the smoothed probability is greater than 0.5. The smoothed probability helps to 
identify when a regime has happened.  
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4.4.4- Expected duration: 
An important question to be considered in a Markov switching model is the expected duration 
of the switches between regimes. The question is, given that we are in one regime or state, how 
long does it take to switch to the next regime or state. In order words, on average, how long 




      (4.12) 




      (4.13) 




      (4.14) 
The Markov Switching Model is used for this analysis and the model is tested with each of the 
main variables of interest to determine the effect of economic sanctions on Iran’s 
macroeconomy.  
4.4- Data Analysis and Estimation: 
The results of the data analysis are presented and discussed in this section. The chapter presents 
the data used and the statistical interpretation and inferences of the results. The results of the 
data analysis are presented in the form of tables, charts, and groups.  
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4.5.1- Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used to determine the stationarity of the data set. The 
results showed that the data set was non-stationary. Therefore, to proceed with the Markov 
Switching Model, the data were transformed into differenced stationarity form by computing 
the first difference. 
Variables were used to measure the effect of economic sanctions on Iran’s macroeconomy, 
they are defined as follows: 
dExchange Rate – the value of Iranian currency with respect to the USA dollar 
dGDP – gross domestic product 
dCPI – consumer price index 
dImports – the value of quarterly goods imported into the country 
dOil Export – the quarterly value of oil exported by the country 
The coefficients for the model were estimated for each variable using the available data. A 
summary of the results is presented in the table on the next page. Comprehensive test results 
for each variable are tabulated in Appendices. 
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Table4.2: Summary of estimated Model Parameters 
Variable dExchange Rate dGDP dDeficit dCPI dImports dOil Export dOil Price 
 Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob Coeff Prob 
               
 Regime 1 
C -0.39 0.01 0.01 0.00 -186.9 0.97 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.01 0.62 -0.06 0.64 
LOG (!) -1.00 0.00 -3.72 0.00 10.43 0.00 -3.57 0.00 -2.00 0.00 -1.86 0.00 -1.10 0.00 
               
 Regime 2 
C 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.44 -84.25 0.73 0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.72 -0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 




Variables dExchange Rate dGDP dDeficit dCPI dImports dOil Export dOil Price 
 P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C P11-C P21-C 
Coefficient -0.90 -2.86 4.08 -2.73 3.05 -2.91 1.94 -2.85 3.34 -1.08 -0.28 -1.23 0.86 -3.17 
Std error 1.05 0.51 1.20 1.98 0.90 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.50 1.19 0.91 
z-Statistic -0.85 -5.60 3.37 -1.37 3.36 -3.39 2.29 -3.42 4.17 -1.30 -0.34 -2.43 0.72 -3.46 
Probability 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.72 0.01 0.46 0.00 
 




Table 4.2 above presents the model coefficients for each of the variables representing the Iranian 
macroeconomy and the variables are mostly significant. C is the regression constant while !  is 
the respective standard deviation. The probability values can be used to determine the significance 
of the model as well as the effect of economic sanctions on Iran’s macroeconomy by the standard 
errors. The element is considered significant if the probability value is less than the alpha (5%). 
Using the above criteria, Table 4.2 shows that there are significant effects from the Exchange Rates 
and CPI because they all have probability values less than 5%, for both regime one and two. 
However, there is no significant effect from the, oil exports, imports and GDP because they have 
probability values greater than 5% in at least one regime. Using the probability value criteria, it 
can be concluded at the 5% level of significance that economic sanctions which were aimed at the 
oil sector do not have significant effects on Iran’s imports and oil exports. During the long period 
of imposed sanctions, the Iranian economy could have had a moderate expansion despite some 
recessions. However, it does have significant effects on the exchange rate and CPI. The Mean for 
the first regime for the exchange rate is 0.4 and 0.03 for the second regime. For the CPI the mean 
is 0.06 and 0.03 in the first and second regimes respectively. In state 1 (0.4) the average exchange 
rate and in state 2 (0.03) is the average exchange rate. Also, the estimated growth rate of GDP is 
0.012% in the first regime and 0.011% in the second regime. The standard deviation in regime 1 
is 1 and in regime 2 is 3 for the exchange rate. We can also see the transition matrix parameters 
for each variable chosen to represent the macroeconomy. They are transition parameters which 





4.5.2- Constant Markov Transition Probabilities: 
Having eliminated some macroeconomic variables because they are less affected by economic 
sanctions due to a lack of significance, we now compute the transition probabilities for the ones 
that are significant. The probabilities show the chances of shifting between the states. The 
probabilities are compiled in the table below. Table 3 is a summary of the estimation of the two 
models with different transitions which are the exchange rate and CPI. 
 
Table 4.3: Constant transition probabilities 
 Exchange Rate  CPI  
States 1 2  1 2  
1 0.9334 0.0665  0.9550 0.0449  
2 0.6927 0.3072  0.2984 0.7015  
 
The table shows the Markov Transition Probabilities for the two macroeconomic variables that are 
significantly affected by the economic sanctions. In particular, they indicate the probability of the 
macroeconomic variables shifting from a state with no sanctions to the state when the economic 
sanctions were imposed. In this case transitions from regime 2 to regime 1 are less likely than 




to shift states due to the effect of the economic sanctions. For the exchange rate, the transition 
probabilities are 0.93 and 0.3 for state 1 and 2 respectively. And 0.95 and 0.70 for the CPI.  
4.5.3- Smoothing Probabilities: 
Smoothed probabilities were computed for each variable to provide a reference to the date of the 
structural break that is when the transition occurred due to the potential impact of economic 
sanctions. The transition is considered to occur whenever the smoothing probability is greater than 
0.5. The smoothing probabilities for the macroeconomic variables that were significant are 
presented in the following figures. 
Table 4.4: exchange rate model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
Regime 1 
C -0.39 0.16 -2.35** 0.01 
LOG (!) -1.00 0.26 -3.71** 0.00 
Regime 2 
C 0.02 0.00 0.00 5.69 
LOG (!) -3.17 0.09 -33.8** 0.00 




P11-C -0.90 1.05 -0.85 0.39 
P21-C -2.86 0.51 -5.60** 0.00 
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The figure indicates the smoothed regime probabilities for the exchange rate variable. The 
probabilities are for the first transition state only. A comprehensive chart showing smoothed 
regime probabilities for both first and second states are found in Appendix H. the graph clearly 
indicates that the smoothed regime probabilities were greater than 50% in 1992, 1993, and 2002, 
2008, 2012 and 2013 which corresponds to the dates of the structural breaks. From the literature 
review, these dates also correspond to the time when there were various economic sanctions 
imposed on Iran, which indicates that the variable was greatly affected by the sanctions. In the 
1980s the US increased the sanctions imposed on Iran, and in 1987-1988 the US applied the second 
set of sanctions on Iran. In 1989 frozen Iranian assets were released by the US. In 1992-93 the 
Iran-Iraq act imposed and banned transfers of controlled technology and goods. In 1994-1995 the 
sanctions were expanded and included the ban on trade with Iran and investment. In 2001 and 
2002 there was executive order 13224 and a press conference which declared that Iran had built 
nuclear facilities, with the suggestion of more sanctions to come in the future. 2008 , 2012 and 
2013 were the time that the UN, EU and US sanction were expanded on Iran respectively. 
Table 4.5: consumer price index (CPI) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
Regime 1 




LOG (!) -3.57 0.16 -22.01** 0.00 
Regime 2 
C 0.03 0.00 16.03** 0.00 
LOG (!) -4.36 0.14 -30.87** 0.00 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C 1.94 0.84 2.29** 0.02 
P21-C -2.85 0.83 -3.42** 0.00 
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The graph above is the smoothed regime probabilities for the CPI given for the first state. A 
comprehensive graph that includes both first and second states is found in Appendix I. As can be 
seen, the structural breaks occurred in 1993-1995, 1999, and 2007-2008 and 2012-2013. Some of 
these periods correspond to dates when economic sanctions were imposed on Iran, as explained in 
the literature. As you can see regimes are slightly persistent in this model. In 1994 there was a ban 
on U.S. government procurement and imports to the US and in 1995 the US extended sanctions 
focusing on trade and investments with Iran targeting the energy sector. In 2008 restrictions were 
imposed on Iran’s access to the U.S. financial system. The US continued extending sanctions in 
2007 to 2010 each year and added some companies to the sanctioned lists in 2007. Also, from late 
2006 the UN imposed sanctions on Iran and extended the sanctions in 2007, 2008 and 2010. EU 
ban was imposed on importing Iranian oil in 2012. 
4.5.4- Expected duration: 
The expected durations were computed to determine how long it takes before a transition occurs 
from one state to another. The summary of the expected durations are compiled in the table below. 
The numbers indicate quarters of a year. 
Table 4.1: Expected constant durations 




State 1 15.03 22.26 
State 2 1.44 3.35 
 
As the table indicates, most variables take a longer time to shift from one state to the next when 
economic sanctions are imposed. It implies that the effects of the economic sanctions are not 
experienced immediately in the macroeconomy and it might take some time before the effects are 
felt. The Iranian economy stays 15 quarters in the regime before it switches due to the exchange 
rate and stays 22 quarters in the regime before it switches due to CPI. 
This part documents the results of the data analysis alongside the accompanying statistical 
interpretation and inferences. The analysis revealed that economic sanctions have significant 
effects mainly on two macroeconomic variables namely the exchange rate, and the consumer price 
index. The other macroeconomic variables, oil exports, and imports, are not greatly affected by 
the economic sanctions.  
4.5.5- Oil exports: 
As Iran is one of the major oil exporters and its economy is largely dependent on oil income, 
sanctions which were imposed on the Iranian economy mainly targeted the oil industry and 





The transition probability for oil exports which determines the probability of transitions between 
the states are presented in the Table below: 
Table 4.7: Constant transition probabilities 
 Oil export  
States 1 2  
1 0.822 0.177  
2 0.536 0.463  
 
The table shows the Markov Transition Probabilities for oil exports which is the main target of the 
imposed sanctions and an important variable for the Iranian economy. This determines the 
probability of the variable transforming from the no sanctions regime to the sanction’s regime. The 
transition probability is 0.822 and 0.463 for state 1 and 2 respectively.  
 
4.5.5.1- Smoothing probabilities: 
Smoothed probabilities are computed for oil exports to provide the structural breaks for when the 





Table 4.8: Oil export 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
Regime 1 
C 0.01 0.03 0.48 0.62 
LOG (!) -1.86 0.18 -10.07** 0.00 
Regime 2 
C -0.00 0.00 -1.80 0.07 
LOG (!) -3.47 0.14 -23.87** 0.00 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C -0.28 0.80 -0.34 0.72 
P21-C -1.23 0.50 -2.43** 0.01 
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The graph shows that the smoothed probabilities are greater than 50% in different events 
corresponding to structural breaks. Iran began to put more focus on nuclear programs in late 1980s 
and early 1990s, in 1992 congress passed an Act to forbid some goods and technology trades. In 
1992 and 1995 Iran signed an agreement with Russia for developing nuclear programs. In 1995 
there was a ban on US investments in Iran aimed at the oil and gas sector but companies where 
able to apply for licences to trade in the oil industry.  in 1996 the Iranian sanctions act was imposed. 
In 1997 the IAEA had a safeguard agreement. In 1998 Ukraine did not sell turbines to Iran due to 
US pressure and in 2000 the US was allowed to sanction individuals and organisations involved 
in the nuclear program. Iran and Russia signed a nuclear cooperation in 2001. In 2002 Iran revealed 
the existence of some nuclear facilities. In 2003 Iran agreed to suspend the nuclear program. in 
2005 US tightened the imposed sanctions.in 2006 US sanctions targeted the oil industry. Iran and 
the EU had talks on trade agreements during 2002 and 2005. In 2007 the UN voted for tightening 
the sanctions targeting the exports and the US extended sanctions, targeting the financial sector 
and in 2008 the UN imposed further sanctions on banks and asset freezes. UN sanctions were 
extended from 2012 to 2014. And in 2016 the Iran sanctions act was extended which was imposed 





The expected duration shows the time it takes for shifting between the states. As is shown in the 
table it takes a short time to transform between the states, so the effects of the shocks are 
immediate.  
4.5- Conclusion: 
The research was conducted to analyse the effects of sanctions on Iran’s macroeconomy and to 
determine whether the imposed sanctions achieve their objectives. In addition, the research 
determines Iran’s responses to imposed embargoes.  
The literature review indicated that the government of Iran uses a number of strategies to 
countermeasure the imposed economic sanctions. However, the main strategies include (1) 
Seeking opportunities for small trading partners, (2) forming trading partners and alliances with 
Asian countries, (3) shifting to gasoline supplies, (4) diversifying its international trade routes, (5) 
establishing long-term regional economic partnerships, (6) development of local technology and 
local markets, and lastly (7) persuading non-American firms to violate the terms of the embargoes. 
These strategies have successfully helped Iran evade the negative impact of the economic 
sanctions. As a result, the economy has been thriving despite the longstanding sanctions. Through 
these avenues, the country has found substantial international and regional markets for its oil 
exports. Iran’s economy greatly depends on oil production. The country’s economy could have 
been greatly affected if it couldn’t find a substantial market for its oil exports. Despite the 




affected the oil price. Iran finds markets for its oil imports mainly from eastern European countries 
such as Belarus and Asian markets like India, China, and Japan as well as Africa countries among 
others. The result show that sanctions affect mostly the Exchange Rate and the consumer price 
index. However, other macroeconomic variables such as the trade deficit, imports, oil export, and 
oil price are insignificantly affected by the economic sanctions. The result of the data analysis 
indicated that, in general, economic embargoes have negatively affected Iran’s GDP. In particular, 
it has led to a slower economic growth rate because the country is unable to reach its full economic 
potential when it is blocked from accessing most international markets. Slow economic growth 
has also contributed to the high level of unemployment in the country. The strength of the local 
currency has also been severely affected, which eventually increased the export income. Low 
exchange rates imply that imported goods would be too expensive in Iran. In addition, the sanctions 
have contributed to the high level of inflation due to increasing CPI, which has affected the lives 
of the citizens by reducing their purchasing power and disposable income. Most household goods 
have become too expensive in Iran as inflation increases. 
The patterns of the smoothed regime probabilities provide an important insight into the ability of 
economic sanctions to affect the exchange rates, GDP, and CPI. They explain the low economic 
growth experienced by the country over the years are associated with the economic embargoes. 
The changes in the probability patterns also provide additional evidence of the effect of embargoes 




From the analysis and the literature review, it is evident that economic sanctions have not achieved 
the objective of isolating and compelling Iran to suspend its nuclear activities. The country is able 
to find markets for its oil and use the money to spearhead nuclear programs. In addition, the 
country still finds access to major nuclear materials and equipment. The ban on joint ventures has 
not succeeded since Iran still finds allies with outer eastern European countries. The resolution to 
stop collaboration with Iran’s credit and national banks has also failed to succeed. 
The most appropriate approach to dealing with Iran could be to create commercial as well as inter-
government agreements at the regional level. Organizations and institutions can play key roles in 
the creation of the necessary commercial agreements.  
Despite the embargoes, Iran has not collapsed economically. it rather continues to improve in the 
global market due to the several counter responses it has implemented. The economic sanctions 
have not effectively succeeded in bringing down Iran’s macroeconomy. Even though other sectors 
are affected, oil, which is the main economic driver in Iran, has not been negatively impacted by 
the sanctions. As the statistical analysis indicates, the oil prices and exports are not affected. 
However, other macroeconomic indicators such as the exchange rates, GDP, and CPI are affected. 
Therefore, if the macroeconomy is not greatly affected, there is no guarantee that the economic 
sanctions achieve their complete goal. The results from my study are in line with Simon (1996) 
who investigated the inflation and oil price shocks in Australia by using the Markov switching 
model. In addition, Morin (2000) indicated that the inflation rise is caused by the sanctions which 




investigating the relationship between sanctions and the exchange rate are rare. In line with 
Naghavi et al (2015) sanctions have led to stabilization over a long period of time rather than 
achieving the sanction’s aim. The results from this chapter and the previous chapter both 
complement each other and both indicate that it is mostly the exchange rate that is the factor that 
is involved and affected by the shocks and imposed sanctions rather than the real economic factors 
in Iran’s macroeconomy. In effect the exchange rate is acting as a shock absorber, its movements 
help restore the competitive balance of the economy and therefore benefit the real economy and 
ensure its stability. I can conclude that due to the fact that the objective of the imposing sanctions 





Appendix A: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Regime 1 
     
     C 0.012574 0.003553 3.538864 0.0004 
LOG (!) -3.724367 0.139525 -26.69323 0.0000 
     
     Regime 2 
     
     C 0.011413 0.014866 0.767738 0.4426 
LOG (!) -2.866621 0.304659 -9.409271 0.0000 
     
     Transition Matrix Parameters 
     
     P11-C 4.080005 1.207378 3.379229 0.0007 
P21-C -2.738769 1.989644 -1.376512 0.1687 







Appendix B: Deficit 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Regime 1 
          C -186.9467 5267.028 -0.035494 0.9717 
LOG (!) 10.43689 0.115481 90.37734 0.0000 
          Regime 2 
     
     C -84.25868 248.6784 -0.338826 0.7347 
LOG (!) 7.234598 0.177277 40.80949 0.0000 
     
     Transition Matrix Parameters 
          P11-C 3.051685 0.907902 3.361249 0.0008 










Appendix C: Imports 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Regime 1 
          C 0.008233 0.016724 0.492300 0.6225 
LOG (!) -2.001458 0.097287 -20.57263 0.0000 
          Regime 2 
          C -0.074121 0.211401 -0.350619 0.7259 
LOG (!) -0.428016 0.255802 -1.673234 0.0943 
          Transition Matrix Parameters 
          P11-C 3.341257 0.800495 4.173988 0.0000 
P21-C -1.082565 0.830715 -1.303173 0.1925 









Appendix D: Oil Price 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
          Regime 1 
          C -0.062054 0.133315 -0.465467 0.6416 
LOG (!) -1.105292 0.310388 -3.561007 0.0004 
          Regime 2 
          C 0.031709 0.013075 2.425186 0.0153 
LOG (!) -2.299249 0.095631 -24.04303 0.0000 
     
     Transition Matrix Parameters 
     
     P11-C 0.866443 1.195207 0.724932 0.4685 
P21-C -3.173796 0.915079 -3.468330 0.0005 











Real Exchange Rate Misalignment in Iran 
 
5.1- Introduction 
As a criterion to measure the national currency equilibrium of a country versus other countries 
currency, the exchange rate indicates the economic status of the given country at the 
international level. As in the previous chapters it was evident that sanctions have had their main 
effect on the exchange rate, in this chapter I concentrate on the exchange rate and its value. 
The deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium value indicates the misalignment 
circumstances. Research studies about the exchange rate and effects of the exchange rate on 
macroeconomic variables shows that there is a negative relationship between the exchange rate 
misalignment and most macroeconomic variables. In this current study, I analyze the real 
exchange rate misalignment in Iran using the Gregory-Hansen co-integration method. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses the theoretical issues about the foreign exchange regimes and 
previous studies, and then models it for Iran and evaluates the results. 
The exchange rate can be defined as the value of a country's currency with respect to another 
country’s and the exchange rate regime refers to the currency system used that determines that 
rate and varies between fixed and flexible rates. The exchange rate regime is considered as one 




the trade of goods and services, capital flows, inflation, balance of payments, and other 
economic variables. For this reason, the choice of exchange rate regime is an essential 
component for economic growth and stability. However, there is no agreement on how an 
appropriate exchange rate regime should be selected, as well as an ideal exchange rate regime 
suitable for all countries. Specific features of countries, policy makers’ preferences, the 
credibility of institutions and policymakers can influence the choice of exchange rate regimes. 
Economic decisions, the size and openness of countries and financial flows, the rank of 
financial and economic development, the structure of production and trade, the recorded 
inflation and the types of shocks that countries face are among the most important factors 
influencing the choice of the exchange rate regime (Wang, 2010). The option of a floating 
exchange rate regime is chosen by most advanced countries, and currently emerging countries 
have also chosen it following the breakdown of a number of pegged regimes during the 1990s. 
In most cases, however, they face major problems in implementing it.  
In an open economy, trading between countries and the flow of capital are affected by several 
variables and indicators, among the most important of them is the exchange rate. In addition to 
affecting exports, imports and capital flows, changes in the exchange rate can impact other 
economic indicators such as inflation and stock returns. Therefore, a considerable part of the 
economics literature has been devoted to the investigation of the open economy and exchange 
rate-related issues. 
One of the most important issues which has received attention from economists and 
policymakers with regard to the exchange rate is the exchange rate misalignment phenomenon. 




equilibrium path in the long run. The balance of payments crises in developing countries are 
often the result of real exchange rate deviations from their long-run equilibrium path (Mehrara, 
2006). Economists agree that real exchange rate stabilization at an inappropriate level, as well 
as the persistence of this misalignment have affected economic wellbeing (Sallenave, 2010), 
economic growth (Harms et al, 2009), capital accumulation (Kandilov et al, 2011), direct 
foreign investment (Goldberg, 2009), export and diversification of exports (Freund et al, 2012), 
currency crisis (Bussiere et al. 2006), and trade balance (Hoffmann, 2007). 
In spite of the studies conducted on the factors affecting the incidence of exchange rate 
misalignment, the study of exchange rate misalignment persistence has received scant attention 
from researchers. The existence of persistence in exchange rate misalignment can at least limit 
part of the efforts of policy makers to keep the general level of prices stable or improve 
economic growth. Iran has always experienced changes in nominal and real exchange rates 
over the past three decades. To calculate the exchange rate deviation, the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (erer) should be calculated first, and then, the amount of misalignment and 
deviation of the real exchange rate from equilibrium values should be calculated.  
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In my study Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is used, based on the CPI of Iran and the US, for 
determining the equilibrium, exchange rate as this is the most popular approach for measuring 





In the next sections, the research literature is explored. The third section presents the historical 
context of exchange rate regimes in Iran followed by determining the exchange rate regime 
measurement and implication. Then research findings are presented. Finally, in the last section, 
the conclusion is presented. 
 
4.6- Literature review 
5.2.1- The literature on the selection of the exchange rate regime 
generally, the literature on the characteristics of exchange rate regimes can be classified to 
three general classifications: 
The first category consists of a part of the literature that focuses on the determination and 
recognition of the characteristics of the currency system. Articles by Marcus Fleming (1962) 
and Robert Mundell (1963) play a central role in this part of the literature. Mundell and Fleming 
have shown that if capital is highly mobile, then fixed and floating exchange rate regimes will 
have quite different outcomes when implementing a policy of economic stabilization. If 
monetary and fiscal policies are defined relative to nominal and real shocks, then a fixed 
exchange rate regime is exposed to nominal shocks, which would minimize production 
fluctuations, while the floating regime is more successful in accommodating real shocks. 
The second category of the literature from Europe after World War II addresses the question 
of how exchange rate regimes can strengthen economic convergence (Barrow and Martin, 




First a fixed exchange rate regime is likely to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, thereby 
encouraging and strengthening trade and investment between countries? Second, if a group of 
countries reach a certain degree of convergence, is it logical to sacrifice monetary policy 
(monetary policy independence) to maintain fixed exchange rates and ultimately become a 
monetary union? 
The third category in the literature was influenced by the high inflation of the 1960s and 1970s 
and emphasizes aspects of the validity of monetary and exchange rate regimes (Gash et al., 
1997). In these models, the central bank faces a problem of credibility, and this problem stems 
from its incentive to reduce unemployment (as well as the devaluation of nominal debt) by 
creating unpredictable inflation. When workers consider this factor in their wage demands, not 
only will unemployment not change, but higher inflation will also be achieved. In a closed 
economy, this can be solved by conferring power on a conservative central bank or gaining 
policy credibility through contractionary monetary policies. In an open economy, fixed and 
pegged exchange rates can be a good alternative to policy makers' credibility, since keeping 
fixed exchange rates can act as a nominal anchor and limit monetary policy. Under these 
circumstances, pegging the national currency to the currency of the country where the monetary 
policymaker has sufficient credibility will make the monetary policy of the country a function 
of monetary policy in the foreign country concerned. Of course, it should be noted that the 





5.2.2- Theoretical studies 
The real exchange rate is a suitable way to show the competitiveness of a country in the global 
markets and a method for measuring the cost of commercial goods produced inside the country. 
The reduction of the real exchange rate leads to an increase in the internal costs of commercial 
good production. The equilibrium real exchange rate determines the corresponding price of 
tradable goods to non-tradable goods in the long-run (Hinkle, 1999). Moreover, the equilibrium 
exchange rate demonstrates the persistence of the values of the variables affecting this rate 
(Hinkle, 1999). Among these variables we can generally refer to monetary, fiscal, commercial, 
and efficiency policies and terms of trade (Mehrara, 2005). A variety of approaches exist to 
calculate the equilibrium exchange rate, which are expressed in brief as follows.  
One of the main theories for investigating equilibrium exchange rate is Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) theory. In this theory, the trading exchanges between countries are supposed to be 
completely unencumbered and unlimited. In line with purchasing power parity theory, we can 
determine that two different exchange rates are in equilibrium when the purchasing power of 
both currencies are equal. In fact, any deviation from the general level of relative prices will 
gradually disappear and the real exchange rate will converge to a constant value.  
The main focus of this approach is in simultaneously achieving the conditions in which the 
internal and external balances are realized. The macroeconomic framework for calculating the 
equilibrium real exchange rate is a combination in which the current account balance is on the 
one side and the capital stock of public and private sectors on the other side. One of the other 
approaches to calculate the equilibrium exchange rate is the behavioral equilibrium exchange 




econometric tools and judge the over valuation and under valuation by comparing its results 
with the real exchange rate. Among the most important determinants of the real exchange rate 
in the framework of the theoretical foundations, which are recognized as fundamental 
variables, are productivity growth, terms of trade, capital inflows and outflows, government 
size, capital accumulation and consumer preferences. 
The terms of trade are one of the most important tools to analyse economic issues such as the 
benefits obtained from an open economy. The improvement of the terms of trade causes an 
increase in the real income of the country, and consequently, an increase in demand for tradable 
and non-tradable goods; however, as the price of tradable goods is determined internationally, 
the increased demand for this type of goods inside the country will not increase the price of 
these goods (Amano, 1995). But the price of non-tradable goods increases by increasing the 
terms of trade, and as the real exchange rate measures the ratio of the price of tradable goods 
to the price of non-tradable goods, an increase in the price of non-tradable goods causes a 
reduction in the real exchange rate. The results of some empirical studies have shown that there 
is a positive correlation between terms of trade and real exchange rate. Additionally, these 
studies have shown that various factors such as the type of currency exchange system and the 
degree of dependence on oil exports affect this correlation (Coudert et al., 2015).  
An increase in capital inflows can occur due to various reasons, such as increased international 
aid, reduction of global interest rates, adjusting several regulatory rules to capital flows, an 
increase in public debts (due to supplying budget deficits from outside) and exogenous 
increases in external creditors' lending. The increased capital inflow causes an increase in the 




small open economy is determined in global markets and is constant, and also as the real 
exchange rate can be defined as the price of non-tradable goods to the price of tradable goods 
ratio, the real exchange rate is strengthened in the long-term by increasing the price of non-
tradable goods (Izadi 2011).  
Based on the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (1964), the difference in relative productivity 
growth between two countries in the area of tradable goods to the non-tradable goods leads to 
real exchange rate variation. Based on this hypothesis, increasing relative efficiency in one 
economy compared to another economy will lead to an increase in the real monetary value. 
Government spending is regarded as one of the main tools for economic stabilization policy.  
Results obtained from empirical studies show that a rise in government spending can increase 
the price level inside the country and weaken the real exchange rates. However, in some studies 
it has also been stated that this relationship will be an inverse relationship. The government's 
decisions on how to allocate spending between tradable and non-tradable goods and the type 
of imposed tax will affect the long-run real exchange rate. Additionally, the increased 
government spending affects the real exchange rate as long as they cause an increase in the 
demand for non-tradable goods versus tradable goods (Ravn et al., 2012).  
Having defined the equilibrium exchange rate, the question arises as to what the exchange rate 
misalignment is and how it is measured.  
The exchange rate misalignment can be defined as a gap between the real exchange rate and 
its equilibrium value. And the equilibrium exchange rate cab ne used as th basis for a 




variables in the realm of policy in developing economies and its calculation is one of the main 
issues in the open macroeconomic area. Choosing a proper level for the equilibrium real 
exchange rate is very important due to its effect on the internal and external balance,  and 
misalignment, whether positive or negative, can disrupt the optimal allocation of resources and, 
consequently, reduce welfare and create economic and social crisis. Undervaluation of the 
exchange rate in terms of external balance can lead to the current account surplus due to the 
profitability of exports and the reduction of imports. In contrast, over valuation can lead to a 
current account deficit. 
 The exchange rate misalignment is one of the factors affecting imbalances in an open 
economy. According to some studies, most of the financial crises during the past two decades 
have occurred in countries in which the exchange rate system has been fixed or crawling over 
the years leading up to the crisis. Among them we can refer to financial crises in Mexico (1994-
1995), Southeast Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2001), and Argentina 
(2002). However, based on macroeconomic models, it is not possible to clearly state which 
system creates greater misalignment in the exchange rate because each of the exchange rates 
bring their own characteristics. Within a floating exchange rate system, the currency market 
determines the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the real exchange rate misalignment is 
temporary. In contrast, considering that it is impossible to adjust the nominal exchange rate in 
the fixed exchange rate system, the risk of real exchange rate misalignment increases. 
However, if the goods market is completely efficient, even if the nominal exchange rate is 
constant, prices can return the real exchange rate to its equilibrium value in response to market 
pressure (Sekkat, 2015). Misalignment may occur in both fixed and floating systems for 




stickiness and use of monetary and fiscal policies, and in the floating exchange rate system, it 
occurs due to incomplete information. 
 Engel (2010) believes that one of the main reasons for misalignment is stickiness in prices, 
and in general, monetary and fiscal policies. In most research studies, in order to investigate 
persistence, only the existence of a unit root has been investigated. However, this framework 
is largely unrealistic and restrictive. For example, some empirical evidence and economic 
theories indicate that many macroeconomic variables have different reactions other than those 
of I (1) and I (0) conditions. In order to resolve this limitation, flexible models were presented 
that included both I (0) and I (1) states, and thus included a wider range of persistence behaviors 
in the variable under consideration.  
In some of the studies conducted on the persistence of economic variables, long memory and 
ARFIMA models were used to measure and assess the persistence value (Agostinelli and 
Bisaglia, 2010: p. 1574). The existence of long memory indicates that an impulse has a long-
term effect on a variable. Additionally, the existence of long memory and persistence is not the 
only characteristic of nonstationary processes and can be observed in stationary processes as 
well. The existence of this characteristic can be investigated by I (d), where d is the degree of 
integration by differencing. In ARFIMA models, the degree of integration can be both an 
integer number and a fractional number. 
5.2.3- Empirical studies on developing countries 
Asgari and Toufighi (2010) investigated factors affecting exchange rate misalignment and its 




study, they defined misalignment as the percentage difference between the real exchange rate 
and equilibrium real exchange rate. According to the findings of this research, the exchange 
rate misalignment had a negative effect on economic growth. 
MacDonald and Vieira (2010) investigated the role of the real exchange rate misalignment on 
the economic growth of a set of 90 countries4 using the generalized methods of moment 
(GMM) method and the time series data spanned the period 1980-2001, the researchers showed 
that the exchange rate misalignment has a strong influence on economic growth. Their results 
showed negative coefficients and as a result they concluded long-run growth decreased the 
greater RER misalignment was. 
Barghandan and Najafi (2010) investigated the effect of the exchange rate deviation on the 
index of Agricultural Producer Support in Iran using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
model. For investigating the long run relationship between the variables the ARDL model has 
been used and the existence of the long run relationship is determined. After calculating the 
real exchange rate, the long run equilibrium exchange rate and its deviation were calculated. 
According to the results obtained from this study, the economy’s degree of openness and the 
world real interest rate have a negative effect on the real exchange rate. The deviation from the 
                                               
4 List of countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Congo DR, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,  Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, 





real exchange rate shows the size and amount of support required for the agricultural producers 
to be less than real value.  
Hosseini et al. (2010) investigated the effect of the real exchange rate deviations on the index 
of wheat producers’ support in Iran during the time period between 1989 and 1997 using the 
vector error correction (VEC) model. According to the results of this study, the equilibrium 
exchange rate had deviated in the given time period and this deviation led to a hidden tax being 
received from wheat producers. 
Mohamadi and Nabizadeh (2013) investigated the long run relationship between the real 
exchange rate misalignment and the import of intermediate, capital, and consumable goods in 
Iran during the period between 1974 and 2011 using fully-modified ordinary least square 
method (FMOLS). In their study they have calculated the long run real equilibrium exchange 
rate and determined the exchange rate fluctuations. They indicated the significant effect of 
exchange rate misalignment on imports in the long run. Same as Barghandan and Najafi (2010) 
this approach the long run relationship as investigated.  According to the results of this research, 
the real exchange rate has deviated from the equilibrium path. Additionally, during the period 
under investigation, the real exchange rate misalignment has caused a reduction in production. 
The present study has introduced innovations from two perspectives compared to the previous 
national studies. First of all, in the majority of studies conducted in this area, the PPP method 
is used to calculate the real exchange rate deviation from equilibrium values. This is despite 
there being no consensus on establishing the required assumptions for using this model, 
including full flexibility of the price level and trading without any limitation in the Iranian 




some of the most effective factors such as the degree of openness are not taken into account. 
Second, in spite of the effect of the persistence of the real exchange rate misalignment on 
macroeconomic variables, the existence of this persistence in the exchange rate misalignment 
has not been investigated in previous studies. 
Musyoki et al. (2014) investigated the real exchange rate misalignment in the period between 
2003 and 1993 in Kenya using the VAR method. This study is based on single equation and 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) specification. These researchers showed that the cause of the 
exchange rate misalignment is the overvaluation of the real exchange rate. According to the 
findings obtained by theses researchers, the exchange rate misalignment has caused a reduction 
in the economic growth in Kenya. 
Bachar et al. (2014) indicated the persistence of real exchange rate misalignment in Morocco 
from 1980 to 2012, they show that misalignment persistence can be explained by structural 
characteristics of the economy such as lack of productivity and degree of openness. Caputo 
(2015) investigated the persistence of real exchange rate misalignment for 54 developed and 
developing countries5 over the period 1980-2011. The findings indicate that in developing 
countries fixed exchange rate regimes decrease the real exchange rate adjustment and 
misalignment persistent increase. Caputo (2015) indicated that in a fixed exchange rate 
regime the exchange rate convergence to its equilibrium is takes place slowly. This is true for 
                                               
5 List of countries: Australia, Algeria, Belgium, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Cote dlvoire, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gabon, Gambia, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Nicaragua, Portugal, Pakistan, Paua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 





the developing countries in comparison with the developed countries. In Iran the government 
has tight control on the economy and the exchange rate. 
 
5.3- Theoretical issues from a historical point of view: 
The new common classification of foreign exchange rate regimes includes nine items as 
follows which is represented by the IMF6: 
1- Truly fixed arrangements 
2- An exchange rate regime based on a currency board in which monetary authorities 
maintain 100% of the reserves in terms of foreign currency against the monetary base. 
Any change in the balance of payments makes the same changes in the money supply 
and does not play a role in establishing internal credit. 
3- Dollarization and complete removal of national currency (systems based on foreign 
currency in which domestic money is completely eliminated). 
4- A currency union in which members choose a single currency. 
5- An adjustable peg, in which minor changes are applied periodically. 
6- A crawling peg is moderated with a series of changes made in the national currency. 
7- A basket peg of currencies when the exchange rate is fixed to a weighted basket of 
foreign currency. 
                                               




8- Target Zone or Bands is the domain in which the exchange rate is determined, and 
monetary authorities interfere when the exchange rate is withdrawn from the target 
range. 
9- Floating and managed floating. A variety of foreign exchange rate regimes are 
shown in Table (1): 
Table 5.1. Types of currency regimes 






Currency Union Adjustable Peg 
Managed Floating Currency Board 
 
Crawling Peg 
Fully fixed system 
Basket Peg Floating 
 Target Zone or Bands 
Source: personal collection from IMF 
Different types of exchange rate regimes have been described in Table since 1880. 
Although 15 exchange rate regimes, are described by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), the main 
choice between a fixed and floating regime is still the focus of the discussion of exchange rate 
regimes. 




Gold standard-based (single or bimetallic), Currency Union, Currency 
Board, Floating 
1880-1914 
Currency exchange systems based on gold exchange, Floating, Managed 
Floating, Currency Union, Fully Floating 
1919-1945 
Bretton Woods Adjustable Peg, Floating (Canada), 2 or more rate 1946-1971 
Free-floating, managed floating, adjustable pegs, crawling Peg, Basket 
Peg, target area or range, Currency Union, Currency Board  
1973-2000 
Source: personal collection 
The choice of exchange rate regime in the past century was a very simple matter. The exchange 
rate choice at that time was between the gold standard as the fixed exchange rate regime on 
one side and floating rates on the other.  
What is now apparent from the experience of the floating system between World War I and 
World War II is that this system has been accompanied by instability caused by speculation, 
poverty and devaluation (Narks, 1944). 
This led to the creation of the Bretton Woods system, which was an adjustable peg system, in 
1944. Many countries, after the Bretton Woods system, have accepted monetary arrangements 
in which the exchange rate of the countries is pegged to a fixed rate in the dollar. In this system, 
the dollar was pegged to gold and allowed to fluctuate by 2.5%, and countries had the right to 
change their value against other currencies in case of fundamental inequality.  
Friedman (1953), in response to Narks popular opinion (1944), introduced a new point on the 
floating exchange regime. According to Friedman, the floating exchange rate has privileges 




adjustment mechanism. Mundell (1961) developed Friedman's analysis by raising capital 
mobility. According to this analysis, Fleming's theory (1962), the choice between a fixed and 
floating exchange rate regime, depends on the origin of the nominal and real shocks and on the 
degree of capital mobility. Based on this view in a capital-intensive economy, exchange rate 
flotation protects the country against real shocks, such as a shift in export demand or exchange 
relations. A fixed exchange rate regime is suited to deal with nominal shocks, such as a change 
in demand for money.  
The optimum currency area is defined as a geographic region in which having a single currency 
and a single currency policy is the best option as noted by Frankel (1999). In economic studies, 
the optimum currency area is also known as the optimal currency region (OCR), and is intended 
to be the geographical area in which the economic efficiency will be maximized if there is a 
single currency in that area. The optimal currency region (OCR) describes the optimal features 
for integrating money by creating a new currency. Based on the theory of optimum currency 
area, the benefits of fixed exchange rates increase relative to the level of integration between 
countries. According to the rational expectations model, an increase in money supply creates a 
predictable inflation that is unhelpful in reducing unemployment. However, only the creation 
of an earlier binding mechanism for the introduction of a monetary rule can prevent the 
mismanagement of economic policy makers at such times. A pegged exchange rate may also 




5.4- Exchange rate regimes in terms of measurement and implementation 
To select an exchange rate regime, it is important to have empirical evidence of the economic 
performance of these regimes. However, before dealing with these studies, exchange rate 
regimes should first be classified. There are two types of exchange rate regime classification: 
First, Classification based on the De juro and De facto exchange rate regime 
And second, a category that is known as the fear of floating and disreputation of policies, is 
presented by Calvo and Reinhard (2000) and Levy-Yati Petty Schwartzinger (2001), and is 
according to the behaviour of countries and their economies. 
The IMF's annual reports on currency arrangements and its constraints are the main source of 
information on foreign exchange policies pursued by countries. This type of classification can 
be used to develop and improve currency arrangements over time, determining factors for the 
choice of exchange rate regimes by countries, and the dependence of exchange rate 
arrangements and their economic performance. Since the exchange rate policies that are 
expressed by countries are considered to be truly equivalent to what they really follow, this 
method is known as the official classification. Although, after the Bretton Woods period, no 
country has the obligation to adhere to what it claims as its exchange rate regime. Due to 
differences between the state's declared policies and what is actually in place, recently a new 
classifier of exchange rate arrangements has emerged. 
The need for this new classification during the Asian crisis, when the difference between real 
and reported exchange rates appeared, became very important. The most famous category was 




classifications may vary in detail, but all emphasize the true behaviour of the exchange rate. In 
other words, the new classification of what countries are doing in practice is the norm, not what 
is stated in the reports. In this way, this classification is known as a real currency arrangement. 
The new real classification seems to have completely succeeded the official classification.  
According to Rogoff (2004), between September 1981 and late 2001, the Swiss franc followed 
a real crawling range of less than or equal to +/- 0.02. In fact, the country's monetary policy, 
which is in keeping with the interest rate stability, is misleading due to being a free-floating 
exchange rate regime. Another example is Canada, which was classified as a crawling 
exchange rate regime in a given domain, between June 1970 and December 2001 for 30 years. 
The old classification (official) is still appropriate to answer some questions. On this issue, it 
is common ground that the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime does not determine the 
monetary policy strategy. In this way, it is quite possible that the monetary policy pursued by 
a country under the floating exchange rate regime will lead to a constant exchange rate, as 
shown by the Swiss example. In general, if we are interested in explaining the monetary policy 
of a country, what the central bank says to the general public may be important. If we look at 
the true behaviour of the exchange rate, what Calvo and Reinhart have called the fear of floating 
exchange rates exists, and when we judge it by the central bank's policy announcements, we 
find that the exchange rate will remain constant. 
There are several reasons why countries actually have fixed exchange rates or seem to have 
fixed exchange rates without having to commit to a fixed exchange rate regime. One example 




policy strategy, in which the exchange rate is one of the many variables that the central bank 
should monitor. 
The second reason for this is that the central bank is aware that the economy is sometimes 
affected by shocks that require significant exchange rate adjustments, and the central bank 
does not want to commit to a specific exchange rate that may make the adjustment process 
difficult. 
The third reason for not announcing the exchange rate is the fear that the target rate will 
attract speculation and the value of the national currency will be reduced. 
These discussions indicate that in order to understand how exchange rate arrangements affect 
economic performance, attention to both nominal and real classification is necessary. The 
classification of exchange rate arrangements in the table below is better understood. 
Table 5.3. Classification of exchange rate arrangements 
Real Classification   
Float Fixed  
Official 
Classification 
B A Fixed 
D C Float 
 
Cells A and D show the exchange rate classification according to what actually happens in the 
market is the same as what the authorities say. Square B shows the exchange rate regime that 




exist, and this lack of compliance by the central bank will have negative consequences for the 
economy. Cell C shows the fear of fluctuations in exchange rates, which Calvo and Reinhart 
have pointed out. 
There are many studies that test if the official classification reflects all information about the 
real behaviour of the exchange rate. For example, one of these studies was done by Carre and 
Voltine (2002), which examined the relationship between fluctuations in the true effective 
exchange rate and nominal exchange rate. They used both the official and true classifications 
and found significant differences between the exchange rate changes in the official 
classification. In particular, true exchange rate fluctuations in regimes officially declared to be 
floating, but fixed in practice, are much more than the exchange rate regimes that are either 
floating or fixed formally and in practice. This suggests that doing what monetary authorities 
officially announce will cause lower fluctuations in exchange rates compared to what can be 
interpreted differently from the announced policies. 
In another study, Alsina and Wagner (2003) explained why in some countries there is a 
difference between what they are doing and what they say. They found differences in the 
quality of monetary institutions and found evidence that in countries where the exchange rate 
regime is announced as fixed, but it is floating in practice (such as cell B), the quality of legal 
entities is worse than those countries that according to the real classification of the exchange 
rate regime, have announced it floating but it’s fixed in practice (like cell C). They interpreted 
that both groups are worried that extreme exchange rate fluctuations (especially in terms of 
devaluation) are considered by market agents as a symbol of their management weakness. In 




to transmit the signs of stability. Rogoff et al. (2003) examined both approaches from the point 
of view of cost-benefit analysis and studied the practical capabilities of each of the categories. 
They divided the IMF countries according to the exchange rate experience into three 
categories; developing countries with limited access to emerging market capital markets, with 
free access to capital markets and advanced countries. This study examines the historical 
durability of foreign exchange rate regimes and the functioning of alternative exchange rate 
regimes, focusing on developing and emerging economies. 
However, the findings confirm that the emerging economies developing for organizational and 
economic reasons need to consider the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime. Also, they 
conclude that fixed or relatively inflexible exchange rate regimes in poor countries did not have 
a bad performance. It seems that countries with weak financial markets and closed capital 
markets are better off with the fixed exchange rate to some extent without losing much of their 
economic growth, albeit on the important condition that monetary policy is in harmony with a 
non-official parallel market and prevents it from fluctuating. They also point out that exchange 
rate flexibility for developed countries that are not members of a monetary union seems to 
allow for more growth, without these countries needing tools such as central bank 
independence and a clear anti-inflationary position. 
Gash et al. (2002) used combined data for 147 countries in the thirty-year period (1970-1970). 
They conclude that according to the International Monetary Fund's classification, countries that 
have pegged their national currency have experienced lower inflation than those countries with 
moderate foreign exchange rate regimes, such as crawling peg or managed floating. Among 




rate regimes, they conclude that countries that peg their national currency rigorously have the 
lowest inflation rates, and other pegged exchange rate regimes still have lower rates of inflation 
compared to more flexible regimes. 
Findings of Louis Pathy and Schwarzenegger (2001) do not differ significantly from the results 
of the study by Gash et al. (2002). They conclude by their own classification that there is little 
difference in the rate of inflation between non-oil economies, irrespective of the foreign 
exchange system that they had over the years (1974-1999). Of course, this is not true of 
countries that have pegged the price rigorously, as well as countries that have had at least 5 
years of soft pegging, and these countries have low inflation, compared with countries that 
follow other exchange rate regimes.  
Bellini and Francisco (2005) obtained similar results from Levi-yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) 
and Gash et al. (2002). As a result of this, vigorous pegging of the exchange rate is significantly 
associated with lower inflation. However, for countries with constant and sustained inflation, 
there is little difference between inflation rates, regardless of whether their exchange rate 
regime is soft peg or float peg. 
The results of a study by Hussein et al. (2005) show that in developing countries (with the 
exception of emerging markets), the exchange rate flexibility is associated with higher 
inflation, but their findings do not differentiate between the vigorous and soft exchange rate 
fluctuations and their relation to inflation. Bellini and Francisco (2007) examined the 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance. They conclude 
that a sharp pegging of the exchange rate is beneficial from the point of view of inflation 




compared to soft pegging. In addition, if exchange rate regimes are classified according to the 
actual algorithm, then any obvious correlation between inflation and the exchange rate regime 
can be considered as a sub-product of different algorithms, which, of course, can be quite 
complicated and put different exchange rate regimes in different groups. 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) examined the factors influencing the choice of the 
foreign exchange system in a study on the endogeneity of the foreign exchange system. The 
studies provide three approaches to the choice of the foreign exchange system: (1) the theory 
of the optimal area of exchange; (2) the financial approach, which emphasizes the effects of 
international financial convergence; and (3) The view of political economy that emphasizes the 
exchange rate in order to strengthen economies facing political challenges. Using the division 
of the De jure and De facto foreign exchange system, this study examines these theories in a 
single and concise way. The results of this study support empirically all three of these theories. 
The political and financial variables in the industrial and non-industrial economies have 
different outcomes. In addition, the relationship between de facto division and its fundamental 
variables is remarkably stable over time, indicating that global trends, which are often 
emphasized in studies, have their effects on the evolution of its natural determinants, and 
practical policies have little effect on the changes and the twists and turns of the exchange rate 
system. Iran tries to keep the official nominal exchange rate fixed and it has become 
overvalued. 
5.4.1: Iran’s exchange rate: 
Iran’s exchange rate history starts with the Gold standard. Iran joined the IMF (international 




was developed because of the political problems. In 1955 Iran had eight different exchange 
rates. In 1967 Iran experienced economic progress and political stability mostly due to oil 
revenue and increases in oil prices. Also, the black market almost came to an end. This boom 
continued over the following years. In 1974 two different exchange rates was established. In 
1979 due to the revolution the exchange rate fell and the black market appeared and the 
exchange rate system was a controlled floating rate. The exchange rate continued to weaken 
till 1983 after which it started to rise but shortly afterwards the exchange rate declined again in 
1984. By 1993 there were unification plans when the rate was almost the same as the floating 
rate. In 1995 due to the controls and foreign banns the black-market rate increased (depreciated) 
rapidly. And this trend has continued over years till now. 
Iran’s exchange rate has been volatile and depreciating over time which can have negative 
effects on macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth.  Iran has faced at least two exchange 
rates since 1980s. Iran has a fixed exchange rate and also a floating black-market exchange 
rate and the gap between the two exchange rates has increased over time. Iran has used a multi-
exchange rate system which has not been successful. The black-market exchange rate was 2400 
Iranian currency to the US dollar in 1993 and the government determined a unification policy 
following the IMF consultation to unify the multiple rate into one exchange rate (Bahmani, 
1995). However, this policy was not successful. There are two exchange rates in Iran, one the 
formal fixed rate by the Central Bank of Iran which has been used for government imports and 
oil exports and the open market exchange rate which is used for public and private businesses. 




5.5- Modelling and estimation results 
5.5.1 Data 
The quarterly data is obtained from the IMF, the Central Bank of Iran and WEO database from 
1990 to 2016 focusing on Iran’s GDP, the real effective exchange rate is from the IMF and the 
Central Bank of Iran provides the data for oil revenue, liquidity, interest rate and stock market 
index. The variables are in logarithmic forms. According to the variables of interest the simple 
long-run model we have is: 
RER= ,-+,..OilRevenue+,/.Liquidity+,0.GDP+,1.InterestRate+,2.StockMarketIndex 
Iran’s GDP growth: 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has an average rate of 3.9 %. With the peak of 23 
% in 1992 and a lowest amount of -16% in 2008. Real GDP Growth is calculated from 




Figure 5.1: GDP growth 
 
Source: personal collection 
 
Iran’s oil Revenue: 
The average value of the oil revenue is 22 percent with the lowest value of 4 percent in 1986 
and a peak of 50 percent in 1974.  
Iran’s Crude Oil Exports have an average of 2,202.300 Barrel/Day with the maximum 
of 2,684.100 Barrel/Day 2004. The data from the central bank of Iran has missing data 
from 1990 and 1993 which the data is extracted from the different Iran’s financial 




















































Figure 5.2: oil revenue 
 
Source: personal collection 
 
 
Iran’s Exchange Rate: 
Iran has faced multiple exchange rate during the last decades. The official exchange rate 
which is a fixed rate by the Central Bank of Iran and the market exchange rate which is a 




















































Figure 5.3: Exchange Rate 
 
Source: personal collection 
 
5.5.2 Research Method 
According to Rogoff et al (2003) and Courdet et al (2011), Mehrara (2006) and Macdonald 
(2000), an open-ended macroeconomic model is used, with the assumption that the capital 
account is open. In this model, supply shocks, demand and monetary policy are considered. 
The model is as follows: 
345 = 6[84 − 84(|;(= − 1)] + 3B + C4    (5.2) 
34D = ,[$4 + E4∗ − E4] + 34∗ + G4     (5.3) 





























































































iL = #4∗ + ($4M.( − $4)      (5.5) 
 
Equation (5.2) is a supply function in which 34 is logarithm of production,	3D is used for the 
demand and 35  is for supply shocks. 84	#$	the inflation rate, and	84( is the expected inflation. 
Past and current values of variables and current and future policy shocks (including targeting 
in the inflation rate and nominal exchange rate) are available in the existing data set I (t-1). 3B 
is natural production level and C4 is supply shock. Equation (5.3) is the IS curve or the total 
demand of an open economy. $4 is logarithmic nominal exchange rate, E4∗ foreign prices and 
E4 is domestic prices. In equation (5.4), the equilibrium conditions are in the money market.	"4 
denotes the logarithm of the volume of money, h is the elasticity of money demand and τ the 
elasticity of demand.	"4 is a monetary policy tool for economic stability. For a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the money supply is targeted at the exchange rate. Obviously, in a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the discussion of temporal incompatibility does not mean a difference in the 
exchange rate in the case of a rule and discretionary monetary policy, while in a floating 
exchange rate regime, the money supply can be used as a tool for discretionary monetary 
behaviour. Assuming that the monetary authority is pledged to a rule, monetary policy follows 
a rule to ensure a zero or low rate of inflation. 
Equation (5.5) represents the conditions for the equalization of uncovered interest parity. In 
view of the above relations, the central bank's objective function, known in the literature as the 
loss function, is expanded as follows: 




According to equation (5.6), the central bank wants to determine the tool at a time horizon to 
minimize the loss function. On the other hand, Taylor's rule, known as the most popular 
monetary policy rule, can be considered. Therefore, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the rule 
for monetary policy is as follows: 
"4 = $̅ +
ST*.
S
U4 + J4 +
.
S
G4     (5.7) 
In this case, changes in monetary policy are followed by adjusting the exchange rate at a 
constant value of $̅. This targeting is based on shocks in supply, demand and monetary policy. 
In these conditions, production and inflation are as follows: 










(G4 − C4)       (5.9) 
It is observed that production and inflation have been affected by supply and demand shocks, 
and monetary policy has not affected them in this approach. In this case, the monetary policy 
controls only the exchange rate. 
While in a fixed exchange rate regime, the policy of discretion is not relevant, in the floating 
exchange rate regime, the rule can vary from the discretionary policy. If the conditions are an 
obligation, the monetary authority by choosing a policy rule (zero inflation rate or target 
exchange rate) during the t-1 period will allow for a regular formation of the expectations of 




and the expected inflation rate selected by the individuals will not be different. So, production 
will change around its natural value: 
34 = 3B + C4        (5.10) 
Therefore, the expected social loss function is as follows: 
(X4Y)( = (Q − ;)3B/ + !Z/     (5.11) 
The loss function is a critical component in optimization problems, such as estimation, 
policymaking, statistical decision making, forecasting and financial investment. Optimal 
monetary policy and its parameters can be obtained from minimizing a social loss function. 
The central bank monetary policy objective involves minimizing the loss function of the 
exchange rate and inflation. 
In the case of discretion where the monetary authority chooses an active policy, if the 
nominal exchange rate is targeted, the equations will be: 












U4       (5.13) 
34 = 3B +
[
[MV\
U4        (5.14) 
Comparing the results in two terms of commitment and discretion reflects inflationary 
fluctuations and distortions in the exchange rate. Therefore, the expected social loss function 










!Z/     (5.15) 
By solving the above equations for the exchange rate, the deviation in the nominal exchange 
rate can be written down in the difference between the terms of the commitment and the 
discretion: 




















($4M.( − $4)  
It is shown that the deviation in the nominal exchange rate is a function of the volume of 
money, supply shock, demand shock, monetary policy shock, expected prices and the natural 
rate of production. 
The graph below shows the time trends of GDP and net assets changes. As shown in figure 





Figure 5.4: Changes in gross domestic product and net foreign asset value of Iran 
 
Source: personal collection 
 
The chart below shows the relationship between commodity prices and the price of oil in the 








































































































































































Figure 5.5: The time trend of the relationship between the exchange of goods and the price of 
oil 
 
Source: personal collection 
5.5.3- Unit root test of the research variables  
Considering that most of the economic time series models imply spurious relationships 
between the variables, it is important to test for the existence of a unit root in the variables. 
Firstly, to determine the existence of unit roots all the variables are tested by using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test due to the fact that it is a common and popular approach 
for testing unit roots in the variables. secondly, the Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration 
approach is used to test for the cointegration between the variables. I am interested in studying 
the long run relationships with structural breaks due to the existence of breaks as a result of the 
sanctions. 
Using the ADF approach, the unit root test indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected so 
































































































Table 5.4:  
Variables ADF 
exchange rate -1.71 
Oil revenue -1.60 
GDP -1.82 
First differenced exchange rate -5.01 
First differenced oil revenue -10.76 
First differenced GDP -3.24 
Critical value at 5% -2.89 
Source: personal collection 
In addition to the ADF test I have also used the Zivot-Andrews test which endogenously 
capture a structural break in the REER. In the first step, the Zivot and Andrews test was used 
to test for the unit root against structural instability. The null hypothesis of this test suggests 
that the root of the unit has no structural break, and the opposite hypothesis states that the 
desired series has a static process with a structural break. Structural break tests can help to 
detect the existence of significant changes in the data.  
     
5.5.4- integration test 
After performing unit root tests with structural breaks, the Gregory-Hansen co-integration test 
was used to examine the long-run relationship between variables with a structural break. The 
Gregory-Hansen test statistic is used in three modes (C), which indicates the level change, the 
state (C/T), which indicates the change in the surface along with the trend and mode, (C/S), 




to the results presented in Table (5), it can be concluded that there is a relationship between the 
variables in terms of the structural break and these variables have co-movement in the long 
run. 
5.5.4.1- Gregory-Hansen (1996) co-integration test 
I use the Gregory and Hansen (1996) residual-based test for cointegration to test for structural 
break. Gregory Hansen co-integration model is an extension of the Engle and Granger model 
whilst allowing for structural breaks. It has been used previously for determining long -run 
money demand relationships along with the structural breaks in these models, as in Bhaskara 
and Kumar (2007). 
The Engle and Granger cointegration approach with no structural break is of the form: 
34 = b + ,.c4 + ,/d4 + ,0e4 + G4      (5.17) 
Where the variables are I (1). In this study, our variables are the exchange rate, oil revenue and 
GDP. 
ecfℎghiejg=e4 = b + ,.k#XjeUehJe4 + ,/lmn4 + G4     (5.17) 
 
The structural change can be determined in changes in the intercept and parameters. The 
Gregory-Hansen test is used to allow an endogenous structural break in the series. This method 
is an expansion of the Engle and Granger (1987) method with a structural break included. The 




cointegration with a structural break. There is a single shift in regimes and the date is unknown. 
Gregory and Hansen extended the Engle and Granger approach by defining a dummy variable 
such as: 
o = p0, #s	= ≤ Q1, #s	= > Q       (5.18) 
In which k shows the break date. For the cointegration test with structural breaks, three models 
are determined which are the level shift (C), the level shift with trend(C/T), and the intercept 
with slope shifts (C/S). 
C Model: 
The simple model with a level shift in the cointegrating relationship is below. Showing a 
change in the intercept and the other parameters are constant. Where b.	is before the shift and 
b/ is after the shift. 
34 = b + b/o4 + ,.c4 + ,/d4 + ,0e4 + G4    (5.19) 
C/T Model: 
b represents the trend coefficient. 





34 = b + b/o4 + ,.c4 + ,..o4c4 + ,/d4 + ,//o4d4 + ,0e4 + ,00o4e4 + G4  
         (5.21) 
The Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration test indicates the existence of an unknown break 
date, which is presented by calculating the usual statistics for all break points and selecting the 
smallest values. 
The breaks dates that are selected accord with the application of significant sanctions which 
are in 2008 when the UN Security Council applied sanctions on banks cargo planes and ships 
carrying previously sanctioned items. and further asset freezes were applied. Also, in 2010 the 
UN Security Council imposed more sanctions on Iran with financial curbs and an expanded 
arms embargo. Also, Iran was banned from buying heavy weapons such as attack helicopters 
and missiles. Also, US sanctions were tightened in the energy sector and new sanctions were 
imposed on petroleum companies trades. The EU also imposed further sanctions on sectors 
such as trade, financial services, energy and further asset freezes. 
Table (5.6) presents the results of the Gregory-Hansen co-integration test. The three Gregory-
Hansen models are estimated by OLS with a trend and proceed with the ADF test. The break 
date is 2008 and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. 
 
 




Model (C) (C/T) (C/S) 
 ADF vS v4 ADF vS v4 ADF vS v4 
t-stat -5.22 -5.02 -46.4 -5.43 -5.11 -52.3 -7.23 -7.86 -61 




(C) (C/T) (C/S) 
5% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 
ADF -4.44 -4.22 -5.11 -4.74 -5.62 -5.41 
v4 -4.43 -4.22 -5.11 -4.74 -5.62 -5.41 
vS -41.5 -35.98 -48.2 -39.9 -60.2 -54.2 
Source: Research findings  
5.5.5- Empirical research model 
In this section, the empirical model is examined and fitted. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the effect of monetary policy on the choice of exchange rate as an anchor in the 
economy in the long-run and investigate the deviation of the exchange rate from PPP. The 

























As we can see, the deviation in the nominal exchange rate is a function of the volume of money, 
a supply shock, a demand shock, a monetary policy shock, expected prices and the natural rate 
of production. The results are shown after the estimation of the equation, using the selected 
variables and estimated results. Accordingly, the parameters are estimated by time intervals. 
Table (5.7):  The results of estimating the factors affecting the exchange rate misalignment 
Variables 
Exchange rate deviation in 
floating regime 
Exchange rate 
deviation in fixed 
regime 
Intercept 0.29 (0.02) 0.61 (0.01) 
exchange rate 
misalignment lag 
0.19 (0.01) 0.55 (0.09) 
Production gap -0.07 (0.02) -0.22 (0.00 
Inflation gap 0/008 (0.02) 0.002 (0.03) 
Oil revenue -2.41 (0.01) -0.25 (0.01) 
WALD statistic 139.98 111.73 
R2 0.92 0.81 
Source: Research findings (numbers in brackets are p values) 
As can be seen, all the variables used in each model are statistically significant and the 
coefficients are also consistent with economic theories. In the estimated regression, based on 
the results of the Wald test, which has a distribution of χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the 




estimates are significantly different to zero for all coefficients at a significance level of 5%. As 
a result, the validity of the estimated coefficients is confirmed. Based on the results of this test, 
the variables used in the model estimation are valid. As a result, the validity of the results is 
verified for interpretation. The R-squared statistic estimation of the estimated model is 0.87 
and 0.79, which indicates the explanation of 87 and 79 percent of the estimated models. 
When analysing the exchange rate and the macroeconomy, the diagnostic tests are important 
due to the fact that it validates the parameter estimation outcomes. Serial correlation occurs 
when the error terms are correlated. Examining the time series, it happens when the errors 
related to observations in a specific time period continue to a future time period. The Durbin-
Watson statistic can be used to test for the existence of serial correlation in the residuals. The 
LM test can be used for examining the higher order serial correlation. The diagnostic tests 
undertaken include the normality and serial correlation tests. The Ramsey RESET and Jacque-
Bera normality test approaches are used to examine features of the residuals.  
Table 5.8: Diagnostic tests 
Test Null Hypothesis t-statistics Probability 
Langrage Multiplier  No serial correlation 16.77 0.59 
Jacque-Bera Normality There is a normal distribution 6.12 0.04 
Ramsey RESET test No significant explanatory power 0.82 0.59 
Source: Research Findings 
Since we are using time series data with a unit root and we have found evidence of cointegration 
we are also using the error correction model (ECM) to explain the short-run dynamic nature of 




back towards equilibrium following a shock to the model. We can also indicate the causality 
between the variables and determine which variable causes the other variable using this 
approach. Moreover, our dependent variable is the different exchange rate. ECM (-1) denotes 
the lagged error correction term. The error correction model gives better results in terms of the 
short run relationships and can be used with non-stationary series. The error term indicates the 
significance of any disequilibrium between our variables in the previous period and the speed 
of adjustment to the equilibrium. The ECM coefficient determines how quickly the relationship 
go back to its equilibrium with a significant error correction term indicating the existence of a 
stable long-term relationship. In this study all variables are differenced and the residuals from 
the model are used to form the error correction term. No lags to the variables are needed as 
there is no autocorrelation. 
By using the error correction model (ECM) we can estimate short-run coefficients. The error 
correction model indicates the quickness of returning to the equilibrium in the model.   A 
significant error correction coefficient demonstrates the presence of a reliable long-run 
relationship (Bannerjee et al.1998), the Error correction model estimates the short run 
coefficients and error correction term that determines the speed of adjustment toward 
equilibrium. The error correction coefficient is -0.43. according to the error correction term the 
adjustment towards the equilibrium is gradually with 43% adjustment one quarter later.  
 




Regressors Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio (Prob) 
LnGDP -0.09 0.04 -2.89 (.002) 
LnOilRevenue -0.65 0.01 -5.17 (.000) 
LExchangeRate 0.20 0.02 3.89 (.000) 
Intercept 1.00 0.02 3.00 (.009) 
ECM (-1) -0.42 0.05 -4.12 (.000) 
 
The results indicate that the effect of the production gap on reducing the exchange rate 
divergence in the floating exchange rate regime is more than the fixed exchange rate regime. 
The coefficient obtained indicates that, taking into account the purpose of the exchange rate, 
using monetary policy to reduce the production diversion leads to a decrease in the exchange 
rate deviation from the target amount to 0.06 and -0.11 in the fixed and floating exchange rate 
regimes respectively. 
On the other hand, based on the estimated coefficients, the deviation of the inflation rate in the 
floating exchange rate regime is less than the fixed exchange regime. This suggests that when 
the monetary policy target is the exchange rate, the policymaker's requirement is the rate of 
monetary growth is based on the rule, which leads to the fact that the deviation in the rate of 
inflation in the fixed exchange rate regime has more severe effects on the exchange rate 
deviation than in the floating exchange rate regime. The coefficients of the inflation rate gap 




Figure 5.6: The time trend of the real exchange rate (LEXCH) and deviation of the exchange 
rate (DD) 
 
Source: research findings 
In addition, the effect of oil revenues on the exchange rate deviation from the target rate in the 
fixed exchange rate regime is higher than the interval floating exchange rate regime. The 
coefficient on oil revenues on the reduction of the exchange rate deviation in the fixed exchange 
rate system and floating interval is 0.36 and 0.25, respectively. In fact, given that in the fixed 
exchange rate regime, the monetary authority loses control over inflation; their efforts will be 
to control the volatility and exchange rate divergence, which indicates the greater effects of the 
oil revenues on the reduction of the exchange rate divergence in the fixed exchange rate regime. 
Finally, the effect of liquidity growth on the exchange rate deviation in the floating exchange 
rate regime is less than the fixed exchange rate regime. These coefficients in these systems are 















the production gap and prices. The stability of the exchange rate in total demand creates 
stability, and, on the other hand, the exchange rate influences the level of prices through the 
supply sector because the nominal exchange rate will affect the prices through the cost of 
imported intermediate goods. The targeting or stabilization of the exchange rate is also 
important in other respects, because, on the one hand, fluctuation in the exchange rate results 
in the reallocation of resources between the production sectors. On the other hand, exchange 
rate fluctuations impose foreign constraints on the domestic policies of the economy because 
the shocks that originate in a single economy will spread to the various sectors of the economy. 
Since, if currency is stabilized, price stability is eliminated, depending on the economic 
conditions and conditions of each country, it may be favourable at one point of time following 
the course of the exchange rate targeting, and at other stages of time it may not be a good 
policy. 
5.6- Conclusion 
The present study investigates the effect of monetary policy in Iran's economy with the 
approach of exchange rate targeting. In choosing an exchange rate regime, the components of 
the political economy were also considered. In a country with a fixed exchange rate regime, 
fixing a currency to foreign currencies will stabilize the value of its currency and will provide 
conditions for increasing the credibility of policy makers, while the floating exchange rate 
regime has the potential to confront the effects of foreign shocks. In addition, the use of a fixed 
exchange rate regime has led to a reduction in the uncertainty of the real sector of the economy, 
which could improve international trade and domestic investment, while the use of a floating 




shocks, therefore it can be regarded as a tool for stabilizing the economy at the time of the 
existence of the business cycle. 
Given that the announced nominal anchor for monetary policy in oil-exporting countries is the 
rate of liquidity growth, the degree of compliance of its rate with the actual values of the 
economy indicates that the ability and credibility of monetary policymakers are weak in 
implementing the announced policies. In fact, the difference between the planned amounts and 
the achieved amounts of exchange rate variables, inflation, and economic growth indicate the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy. Regarding the continuation of growth rates above the 
announced targets of liquidity, it can be concluded that the performance of the central bank has 
had an expansionary bias and has led to a weakening of the monetary policy credibility. 
However, the performance of the entire period reflects a deviation in the monetary policy 
performance from the goals of growth of monetary aggregates, exchange rate, inflation and 
economic growth. The extent of this diversion has varied considerably over time, due to oil 
revenues and different approaches to economic and monetary policy. Proposals can be made 
to implement disciplined monetary policy in the banking system, so that most policies are based 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Sanctions are becoming more and more common as a tool for policy makers to gain their 
objectives. The aim of the sanctions is to have a negative effect on the targeted economy to 
persuade the government to change policies. However, the effects may be different regarding 
the target country’s economy, political situation and international relations. Although the 
existing literature has determined the ineffectiveness of sanctions, the number using this as a 
policy tool is increasing. This study empirically analyses the effects of sanctions on 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, oil exports, CPI, official and market exchange rates, 
imports and the deficit for Iran. Iran has faced significant unilateral US sanctions in 
combination with multilateral sanctions from the UN and EU. Iran has faced different kinds of 
sanctions aimed at the economy, financial sector and trade. Using the period of time from 1990 
to 2017 for Iran when a succession of sanctions were applied I have shown that overall the 
sanctions have not been particularly successful with the Iranian exchange rate buffering the 
effects. The depreciation of the currency has increased inflation, but allowed the rest of the 
economy to continue largely as normal. This is partly because Iran’s exports, mainly oil are 
now more competitive, especially to countries not taking part in the sanctions. In some ways 
this reflects how Iceland recovered from the financial crisis shock to its economy, with the 
depreciating exchange rate buffering the rest of the economy. I have used different methods to 
analyse sanctions such as the asymmetric vector autoregressive model and the Markov 
switching model.  
Moreover, the impact of monetary policy on the Iranian economy has been investigated through 




policy have been ineffective and most of the time has not gained the expected result. The 
Central Bank of Iran has tried to control the exchange rate while the floating black-market 
exchange rate was in existence. I have shown that there are exchange rate misalignments which 
have widened over time. Oil revenue has had more effect on the exchange rate misalignment 
in the fixed exchange rate regime than the floating exchange rate regime. Also, the effects of 
liquidity growth on the exchange rate misalignment has been more in the fixed regime than the 
floating regime. Sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran in 2012 affected the oil export 
market and economic sanctions in 2012 have had a significant effect on the exchange rate. 
Central bank of Iran’s report on monetary variables indicate that liquidity has increase 
significantly between 2013 and 2020 and at the same period of time Iran’s economic growth is 
fluctuated between zero and one percent. Budget deficit is one of the main reasons of increase 
in liquidity growth which also is a result of increase in inflation. Moreover, central bank of Iran 
is dependent to the government and government debt to central bank is increasing.  Along with 
the imposed sanctions, liquidity growth and corruption have caused the Iranian currency 
decrease significantly. 
 Iran has used different strategies to offset the effect of sanctions with the main approach 
involving shifting to alternative trading partners and offering deals encouraging the partners to 
cooperate with Iran. Iran was subsequently able to reduce the effects of sanctions through these 
strategies and allowing the exchange rate depreciation to restore Iran’s competitiveness 
internationally. The Markov switching regime results have shown that the exchange rate and 
CPI have been affected by sanctions significantly rather than other macroeconomic variables 




Sanctions have had a negative effect on GDP and this could be mostly due to oil and gas 
sanctions and dependency of Iran on its oil revenue and the loss of oil exports due to the 
imposed sanctions. The high inflation suffered by Iran has reduced the purchasing power of 
individuals too, suggesting that not all Iran’s strategies to overcome sanctions have been 
entirely successful. Overall the smoothed probabilities have shown an effect of sanctions in 
shifting trends in GDP, CPI and exchange rate.  
The variance decomposition in the VAR model indicates that the negative oil price shocks had 
more of an effect than positive oil price shocks in the long run impact on the exchange rate. 
However, oil export shocks do not have a significant effect on GDP and the deficit but the 
deficit has a 15% effect on the consumer price index. Oil exports have significant effects on 
the exchange rate. Imports are not affected significantly by other macroeconomic indicators. 
According to the impulse response functions of the vector autoregressive model, oil export 
shocks have negative impacts on the consumer price index and exchange rate although the 
effect on the deficit and imports is insignificant.  
International financial sanctions have limited Iran’s oil revenues and Iran faced a sharp 
decrease in its currency. Haidar (2015) argued that although sanctions may not reduce the total 
exports of Iran although export costs have increased. In the case of sanctions imposed on the 
oil sector, if the aim of these sanctions is a sharp reduction in oil exports, this strategy has not 
been effective. Moreover, as long as there are ways to shift trade from countries to other 
countries it will reduce the effectiveness of sanctions. Regarding isolating Iran to stop the 
nuclear program and preventing foreigners from collaborating with Iran’s credit markets, the 




the embargoes on the oil sector, the effect on oil exports and prices are not significant. Although 
other factors such as the exchange rate, CPI and gross domestic product are affected more. As 
long as some of the macroeconomic variables are unaffected, then the goal of sanctions have 
not been achieved. However, some may conclude sanctions to be successful because of the 
agreement in 2015. But there have been disagreements and more sanctions again after this 
agreement. In general, the effects of sanctions on Iran have been moderate. 
Policy Implications and further Research: 
 The policy implications of this study are that using sanctions to target specific industries such 
as oil tend to be ineffective, sanctions need to target those areas and industries where there are 
not alternative markets in other countries for those products. There will always be demand for 
oil, so possible sanctions should switch to other potential export markets for Iran. In addition, 
multilateral sanctions tend to be more effective rather than unilateral sanctions in obtaining 
their objectives. As the exchange rate is affected significantly by the sanctions, policy makers 
may focus more on this indicator when deciding on appropriate sanctions. If the cost of 
sanctions for the target country are not sufficiently damaging, they won’t change their 
behaviour.  
 In the future, when more data becomes available additional studies are required to analyse the 
effects of sanctions on the Iranian oil sector. Moreover, other monetary variables can be added 
to complement the ones used here. This study could also include other factors affecting the 
Iranian economy such as corruption and compare it with the effects of sanctions on the Iranian 
macroeconomy to determine which factors have the most significant affect. In addition, the 




the economy. In this study estimations were limited by some lack of data. The sanctions were 
treated as homogenous but in reality, some sanctions are more effective than others. Future 
research could define the strength of the sanctions as well as more specific timing. Results 
could potentially be transferable to other countries as the exchange rate is the main factor of 
interest, any country that has a flexible exchange rate can be investigated. In general, the 
sanctions effectiveness is weak and the economic sanctions are limited and they pursue 
different targets, so future research could assess different countries, where alternative sanctions 
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